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INTRODUCTION
Debates over the proper functions of courts have focused primarily on
delineating the outer bounds of judicial authority.1 Indeed, the primary danger
associated with the judicial branch bears a name—“judicial activism”—that
invokes imagery of courts doing more than they should. Among their other
perceived transgressions, “activist” judges reach out to decide issues the parties
did not raise, or decide cases on grounds that go well beyond those necessary to
resolve the precise dispute presented.2 Whatever the particulars of the conduct
at issue, the thrust of the activist critique is that the judge to which it is applied
1. See Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1237 (2004)
(“Contemporary constitutional law, in its quest for judicial restraint, has primarily focused on ‘the how’
of judging—what interpretive methods will constrain the decisionmaker?”); cf. Susan Bandes, The Idea
of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 259 (1990) (suggesting that prevalent, exclusionary approaches to the
definition of a “case” for purposes of Article III “may come from considering Article III solely as a
limitation on the courts, and not as an exhortation to perform certain tasks”).
2. Of course, “judicial activism” is itself a term without a fixed definition. See generally Keenan D.
Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004) (tracing
the history and uses of the phrase). Kmiec “identifies five core meanings of ‘judicial activism’: (1)
invalidation of the arguably constitutional actions of other branches, (2) failure to adhere to precedent,

2005]

DEFINING JUDICIAL INACTIVISM

123

is exercising too much authority, and thereby overstepping the proper bounds of
the judicial role.
But what of what we might term “judicial inactivism”? Judicial inaction,
which operates to preserve the status quo, can have consequences that are every
bit as significant as those resulting from judicial action.3 And if there is good
reason to be concerned about judges acting in ways that go beyond their
assigned role, then there is good reason to be concerned about judges acting in
ways that fall short of their assigned role. Indeed, because doing nothing
generally leaves fewer traces than doing something, judicial failures to meet the
minimum requirements of the role are likely to be more difficult to detect than
action going beyond its proper limitations. As a result, we ought perhaps to be
more concerned about judicial inactivism than we are about judicial activism.
Yet there is no literature concerning the problems of inaction.4 This Article
seeks to begin the process of filling that gap and raises the basic question of
what judicial inactivism, or at least one variety of it, might look like. Roughly

(3) judicial ‘legislation,’ (4) departures from accepted interpretive methodology, and (5) result-oriented
judging.” Id. at 1444.
3. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 851 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[O]ne of the very purposes fueling the birth of administrative agencies was the reality that governmental refusal to act could have just as devastating an effect upon life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
as coercive governmental action.”).
4. There are some limited exceptions. The debate over unpublished opinions is one such exception,
and one featuring a great deal of recent activity. The most recent flurry was touched off by the Eighth
Circuit’s short-lived holding in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2000), that
Article III of the Constitution incorporates the doctrine of precedent into the nature of the judicial
power, such that federal courts must accord precedential effect to all their decisions. The Ninth Circuit
promptly and emphatically rejected this view in Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir.
2001). Since then, legions of trees have been sacrificed in service of the debate over the propriety of
unpublished, nonprecedential opinions. A few of the more recent contributions include: Martha Dragich
Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004); Michael B.W.
Sinclair, Anastasoff v. Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential Authority to
Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 695 (2003); Carl Tobias, Anastasoff, Unpublished
Opinions, and Federal Appellate Justice, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1171 (2002); Lauren Robel, The
Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive
Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002); Johanna S. Schiavoni, Comment, Who’s Afraid of Precedent?
The Debate Over the Precedential Value of Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1859 (2002).
There is also a currently pending proposal to amend Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 to allow
parties to cite to unpublished opinions. For a critique, see Anne Coyle, Note, A Modest Reform: The
New Rule 32.1 Permitting Citation to Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 (2004).
Other exceptions include the debate over judicial candor, see infra Part II.C, and the debate between
Martin Redish and David Shapiro discussed infra at note 15. This latter debate comes closest to
addressing the problems confronted by this Article but is, as noted therein, distinct in a couple of
significant respects.
On a broader level, several prominent commentators have developed sets of standards for or
necessary components of a properly functioning appellate court. E.g., 3 AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS (1994); PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET
AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 7–12 (1976). These formulations tend to be somewhat more loosely constructed
than what I hope to achieve here, more overtly aspirational, and more focused at the systemic level than
at the adjudication of individual cases.
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stated, the inquiry considers whether a court may decide not to decide. To put it
somewhat more precisely, may a court presented with a justiciable claim over
which it has jurisdiction choose not to adjudicate that claim? Or, put yet another
way, does the judicial function include some inherent discretion to avoid
adjudication?
The instinctive response to such questions is “absolutely not.” Adjudication
of disputes is, after all, why courts exist.5 So long as I can assert that someone
has violated a legally protected interest of mine6 and that I am therefore entitled
to a remedy that is within the court’s power to grant, the common understanding
is that the court to which I bring my claim must act on it. What is more, this
understanding holds that the court must act even if it fears the likely consequences—such as the creation of a potentially troublesome precedent or the
protection of conduct it finds distasteful.7 Thus the court must determine both
the scope of my asserted interest and whether the conduct at issue violates that
interest. If so, it must further determine whether I am entitled to the remedy I
seek, some other remedy, or no remedy at all. In addition, the court should
(particularly if it is an appellate court) issue an opinion in which it provides a
reasoned explanation for its conclusions that is grounded in the applicable legal
authority.
But this instinctive understanding of what courts should do coexists with a
suspicion that courts often fail to act in accordance with the ideal. Regardless of
whether courts ought to enjoy, in the abstract, the discretion to avoid disputes,
claims, or arguments they would prefer not to confront, we suspect that they
nonetheless do engage in such avoidance. Courts often leave the impression that
they have not adjudicated a claim that “should have” been adjudicated.8
This Article explores these neglected issues and seeks to locate some of the

5. As Alexander Bickel puts it, courts of general jurisdiction “sit as primary agencies for the
peaceful settlement of disputes and, in a more restricted sphere, as primary agencies for the vindication
and evolution of the legal order. They must, indeed, resolve all controversies within their jurisdiction,
because the alternative is chaos.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 173 (2d ed. 1986).
6. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4 (1988).
The kinds of claims a court may property act upon are . . . limited. The claim must normally
be contested—that is, the subject of a dispute. The claimant normally must assert that the
respondent has either infringed (or threatens to infringe) upon his rights, or is otherwise at
fault in a manner that sufficiently invokes the claimant’s interests to render it appropriate for
him to make a claim whose disposition turns on that fault. The claim must be based on a
standard that relates to social conduct rather than, say, on an artistic standard. The standard on
which the claim is based must rise to a certain level of significance, in terms of either the
seriousness of the injury that typically results from its violation or the importance of the norm
or policy that it reflects.
Id.
7. See infra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part I; see also BICKEL, supra note 5, at 122 (“There is no judicial discretion to decline
adjudication, no such attenuation of the duty. But many judges have thought, and most have from time
to time acted, otherwise.”).
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contours of what I will call the “duty to decide” or “adjudicative duty.” The aim
is to attempt to distill the minimal components of the judicial role by way of an
analysis guided by past efforts to conceptualize that role. The inquiry accordingly draws on prominent models of adjudication—primarily Lon Fuller’s
participation-based version of the classic model9 and Abram Chayes’s and
Owen Fiss’s formulations of the public law model10—and brings that body of
theory together with the largely distinct literature concerning the extent to
which judicial opinions ought to fully and accurately reflect the reasoning
behind the decisions they justify.11 The analysis reveals a largely consistent
conception of what courts’ minimal adjudicative obligations ought to entail.
Reduced to its essence, the conclusion is that courts should operate under a duty
to decide the claims presented by the parties in what I call a “weakly responsive” fashion, and that there ought to be a strong preference for providing a full,
candid statement of the reasons the court decided as it did. Perhaps the most
significant component of this duty—at least in the sense that it involves an
obligation thus far only implicit (at best) in the literature—is the concept of
“weak responsiveness.” This is the notion that adjudicative legitimacy depends
not so much on the courts’ generation of decisions that are based on and strictly
proceed from the parties’ proofs and arguments (as Fuller would have it), but
rather on decisions that squarely confront those proofs and arguments, even if
the court determines that they do not ultimately supply an appropriate basis for
resolution.12
More broadly, my goal is neither to present a comprehensive catalog of
judicial inactivism, nor even to provide the last word as to those forms of
inactivism that I identify.13 I aim instead to frame what I anticipate will be an
ongoing debate, and to offer a way of thinking about the judicial role that can be
useful not only in resolving existing controversies—such as that over the
appropriate use of unpublished opinions14—but also serve as a reference point
in questions of process and institutional design that will inevitably arise as the
stresses on the judiciary continue to mount.
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I undertakes an initial
exploration of the sorts of judicial behavior that might qualify as inactivism and
9. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
10. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 25–27 (1979).
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. Two additional points bear mention, so as to help frame what I hope to accomplish by
underscoring what I do not attempt to accomplish. First, this is not an article about interpretive method,
but rather about the processes by which such methods ought to be applied. This is not to suggest that
some of the arguments I make do not have implications for questions of interpretive methodology, but
only that they are not the focus of this Article. Second, this is not an article about judicial review or
federal jurisdiction, at least not directly. My focus instead is on adjudication more generally, such that
the analysis applies as much, if not more, to state courts as to federal courts.
14. See supra note 4.
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considers some of the theoretical and empirical difficulties that accompany an
attempt to formulate the duty to decide. It also suggests that structural and
procedural changes in the methods of adjudication implemented over the last
several decades have operated to reduce the effectiveness of the traditional
checks against judicial inactivism, and that the continued accumulation of
pressures from growing caseloads will lead to the continuation of these trends.
Part II surveys the literature formulating and commenting upon models of
adjudication, focusing primarily but not exclusively on the “classic” and “public
law” models and their interrelation. It also discusses the topic of judicial candor,
or the extent to which courts should be obligated to provide the “true” reasons
for their decisions. Finally, Part III first articulates a framework for approaching
the formulation of an adjudicative duty. From there, it proceeds to consider the
implications of the theory discussed in Part II for the components of the duty,
and distills from that analysis the core components of the duty before returning
briefly to the examples introduced in Part I.
I. BREACHES OF THE ADJUDICATIVE DUTY: AN IMPRESSIONISTIC OVERVIEW
Imagine a garden-variety civil lawsuit. Plaintiff claims to have been wronged
by Defendant, and brings suit claiming an entitlement to recovery under a
handful of theories. Defendant responds by disputing Plaintiff’s characterization
of the facts, by arguing that Plaintiff has misinterpreted the law underlying its
claims, and by raising an affirmative defense. There is no basis for suggesting
that either the case or any of the claims are non-justiciable. This is, by all
appearances, a lawsuit that must be adjudicated.
But is that so? Does the court have the power to decide not to decide? In
other words, does the judicial power encompass the discretion to avoid adjudication altogether (or in part) even beyond that conferred by the various justiciability doctrines? To approach the matter from the opposite direction, if there is a
duty to decide, how far does it extend? Will the court satisfy its obligations by
simply picking a winner as between Plaintiff and Defendant, or must it engage
with each of their claims and defenses—or perhaps even the specific underlying
arguments? Must the court disclose the reasoning behind these decisions, or will
simply announcing the result suffice? If it must disclose, does that obligation
extend to all the reasons behind the court’s decision? To some subset? Are the
answers to these questions different if the court is a trial court versus an
intermediate appellate court versus a court of last resort with discretionary
jurisdiction? What if the case is not a bilateral dispute over private rights, but
rather one the resolution of which will necessarily impact a substantial number
of non-parties, as in a suit to compel the enforcement of an environmental
regulation? Are the answers absolute? In other words, assuming there is a duty
to decide, is it really a “duty” that must be satisfied in every case, or is it instead
a set of “preferences” that should be satisfied in most cases but which must in
some cases give way to certain conflicting ideals?
These are the questions this Article explores. Their answers, of course,
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depend to a large degree on the purposes of adjudication and their interrelation
not only with one another but also with the mechanisms of adjudication, a topic
that is the subject of Part II. Before undertaking that inquiry, however, it is
appropriate to develop the questions further. The first subsection of this Part
provides a somewhat impressionistic overview of the problems of judicial
inactivism, providing both context for the analysis that follows and consideration of some of the difficulties involved in attempting to define an adjudicative
duty. The second subsection explains why an investigation of these questions is
important in general, and why recent changes in the adjudicative landscape have
increased the significance of these issues over the past several decades.
A. THE PROBLEMS OF INACTIVISM (INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION)

There is more than mere intuition behind the notion that courts must decide
the matters put before them. The very existence of justiciability doctrines,
which excuse courts from deciding cases in certain circumstances, implies that
where those circumstances are not present, courts do not enjoy the freedom to
abstain from adjudication.15 Outside the reach of these doctrines lies a presumably large category of cases in which a party has presented a legally cognizable
claim of right to an appropriate judicial body and prosecuted that claim in
accordance with all applicable procedural requirements. In these cases, where
no justiciability or similar doctrine could plausibly relieve the court of its
15. There is, of course, room for debate concerning how broadly such doctrines ought to apply to
excuse courts of their obligation to decide. But even Alexander Bickel, who advocates the broad
utilization of justiciability doctrines, recognizes that there are limits. See BICKEL, supra note 5, at 170
(“[T]here are limits to the occasions on which these doctrines and devices may be used, limits that
inhere in their intellectual content and intrinsic significance.”). There is also room for debate regarding
whether some discretion to decline jurisdiction exists beyond the reach of justiciability doctrines.
Compare Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (criticizing judicial abstention doctrines as contrary to separation of powers
principles), with David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985)
(advocating broad judicial discretion to decline to adjudicate cases over which jurisdiction exists). For
additional background, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER ’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 650–55 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing the issue of whether the Supreme Court
enjoyed the discretion under its pre-1988 mandatory jurisdiction to decline adjudication); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891 (2004) (discussing the
themes developed in Shapiro’s article). Note, however, that not even Shapiro advocates unbounded
discretion. Instead, he calls for the exercise of principled jurisdictional discretion, which
means that criteria drawn from the relevant statutory or constitutional grant of jurisdiction or
from the tradition within which the grant arose guide the choices to be made in the course of
defining and exercising that jurisdiction. Of equal importance, it means that these criteria are
capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts, evaluated by critics of the
courts’ work, and reviewed by the legislative branch. The elemental requirement of candor,
which is basic to the proper carrying out of the judicial function, calls for no less.
Shapiro, supra, at 578–79. While there is some overlap between the subject of the Redish-Shapiro
debate and the problems addressed in this Article, their debate is concerned solely with the federal
courts and how those courts are to exercise the limited jurisdiction conferred on them. My analysis
assumes away the jurisdictional question, and considers what it is that a court that even Shapiro would
agree must adjudicate a case is obligated to do.
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perceived adjudicative obligations, decision would appear to be mandated.16
Yet any search for the body of law articulating this assumed mandate would
be in vain. This is not to suggest that the entirety of American case law is free of
language that could be taken to support the proposition that courts must decide
such cases. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall appeared to speak directly to the
question in Cohens v. Virginia:
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we
must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may
occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them.17

The principle for which Cohens is typically cited, however, is not the notion
that courts operate under a generalized duty to decide, but instead the “doctrine
of necessity,” which governs in cases of judicial disqualification and holds that
in a situation where all judges available to hear a case would be disqualified
under normally applicable principles, one or more of them must nonetheless
entertain the case because of the necessity of providing some judicial forum.18

16. This understanding is occasionally articulated, but typically assumed. For example:
If a claimant comes before a court of general jurisdiction with jurisdiction also over the person
of the defendant and asks for a remedy of a type which the court is empowered to give, the
dispute, it seems, must always be adjudicable. For either there is some previously formulated
settlement affirming or denying the right to the remedy or there is not. If there is, the question
of the claimant’s right, of course, can be determined by conventional processes of judicial
reasoning. If there is not, then, it is suggested, the only difference is that reasoning must probe
more deeply to the basic postulates of the social order—to the rational implications of the
‘shared purposes’ of the members of the society of which Professor Fuller speaks. A reasoned
answer to the question whether those implications do or do not justify the asserted right will
always be possible. Within the limits fixed by established remedies, in other words, the
common law provides a comprehensive, underlying body of law adequate for the resolution of
all the disputes that may arise within the social order.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 646–47 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also Jeffrey
O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals,
66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 716, 732 (2001) (suggesting that the federal courts of appeal lack a general
ability to avoid adjudicating the claims brought to them); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
“Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
25 (1964) (arguing, in the context of a response to Bickel, that “there is an obligation to decide in some
cases; there is a limit beyond which avoidance devices cannot be pressed and constitutional dicta
cannot be urged without enervating principle to an impermissible degree”). Indeed, Bickel himself
recognizes the appropriateness of this conclusion outside the context of Supreme Court adjudication of
constitutional cases. See supra note 5.
17. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213–16 (1980) (discussing the history of the rule
of necessity); Betensky v. Opcon Assocs., Inc., 738 A.2d 1171, 1176 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (“Given
the fact that courts have an institutional obligation to hear and decide the cases brought before them, the
common law long ago created what is referred to in judicial disqualification cases as the rule of
necessity. Stated succinctly, the rule of necessity is that if everyone is disqualified, no one is
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And despite the occasional suggestions of a more broadly applicable duty,19
there simply does not exist a body of law that meaningfully supports such a
doctrine, to say nothing of a developed jurisprudence addressing what the duty
might require. What is more, the evidence suggests that courts frequently act
contrary to a duty to decide.20
Neither case law nor academic commentary has squarely confronted the
propriety of judicial failure to decide in these situations where decision seems
required.21 It remains, then, to explore whether there even is such a thing as
judicial inactivism, or whether instead some sort of discretion to avoid adjudication inheres in the judicial function apart from the familiar, doctrinally sanctioned mechanisms of avoidance. If there is no such discretion, it is easy to
imagine what judicial inactivism would look like. A failure to decide could take
a multitude of forms. In its most extreme sense, a court could simply fail to
respond. Imagine a case in which the parties undertake all the appropriate steps
to put their dispute before the court, following which the court does nothing. It
issues neither an opinion nor an order summarily stating the result, and it
provides no justification for its failure to act. This would, of course, be a
complete abdication of the judicial role, and would necessarily violate any
formulation of a duty to decide, for any standard that condoned such behavior
could not be justified as embodying a duty. Such failures are, not surprisingly,
exceedingly rare.
At the other extreme, an adjudicative duty might entail an obligation to
decide the matters put before the court on the parties’ terms.22 So delineated, the
duty would require the court to decide the parties’ dispute precisely as they have
defined it. At this end of the spectrum, failure is inevitable. Nearly every

disqualified. Thus, in a judicial salary case, where all judges by definition have an interest in the
outcome of the case, the judge assigned the case has a duty to hear and decide the case, however
disagreeable that task might be.”); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Hawkins, 775 So. 2d 101, 104–05
(Miss. 2000) (McRae, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohens and surveying cases adopting the rule of
necessity).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 165 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that a litigant has
a “right to have all issues fully considered and ruled on by the appellate court”), quoted in Bernklau v.
Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
20. See supra note 8. For examples of cases in which a dissenting judge accuses the majority of
avoiding the issues actually raised by the parties, see Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, 590 N.E.2d
1228, 1236 (Ohio 1992) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Today’s majority opinion is so far afield from
what the court of appeals held, and what this case is all about, that it is my guess that the court of
appeals’ judges . . . and also the parties herein, will not recognize that we are discussing their case.”);
Simmons v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (Riggs, J., dissenting)
(“The majority either misunderstands, mischaracterizes or chooses to ignore the issues actually raised
by the parties.”); and Bethea v. Forbes, 548 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Pa. 1988) (Larsen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the majority’s resolution of the case “ignores the legal issues
which were raised and argued by the parties in the lower court, considered and decided by the lower
court, and raised and briefed on appeal”).
21. As noted above, there are several debates that discuss aspects of the larger question, see supra
note 4, but I am not aware of previous efforts analogous to the one I attempt here.
22. See infra Part III.B.2.
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conflict that results in litigation involves some fundamental incompatibility of
viewpoint. Even if the parties agree in broad form about the nature of their
conflict, they will not agree about its particulars, such that it would be meaningless to talk about “the dispute” between the parties. Indeed, it is the very
absence of complete agreement concerning the contours of the relationship
between them that has resulted in the conflict they have asked the court to
resolve. Nor will the court share every aspect of the parties’ view of the case.
The same features of human psychology that prevent the parties from taking
identical views of their dispute will likewise lead the court to form its own
perspective.23 Even if the court were somehow able to fully adopt the characterization of one of the parties, it could not fully adopt both. The necessary result
would be that at least one of the parties would feel to some degree that the court
did not decide the dispute as envisioned by that party.24
The more interesting cases lie between these extremes, where there exists a
broad range of judicial behavior that might qualify as a failure to decide.
Imagine, for example, Defendant X, who has been sued for consumer fraud
based on conduct that X claims is shielded from liability under the First
Amendment. A court that simply ignored X’s argument of First Amendment
protection could, absent some overriding rationale that rendered the argument
superfluous,25 justifiably be characterized as having breached its adjudicative
duty. From X’s perspective, the court has decided some other case, one involving different rules, and imposed the results on the parties to the case before it.
Assessment of whether the court acted properly in this situation may depend
on the court’s motivations for ignoring the argument. A court that affirmatively
chose to avoid the argument, because of a sense that the plaintiff’s claim ought
to succeed regardless of whether the conduct fell within the protection of the
First Amendment, would have acted inappropriately by most assessments. The
same is true of a court that simply failed to consider the argument out of
carelessness. We might, however, choose to excuse a court that disregarded the
First Amendment argument were it made not as the centerpiece of X’s case, but
rather as an insignificant part of a “kitchen sink” answer to the complaint or as a
throwaway argument tacked in superficial fashion to the end of a brief. Perhaps
in this latter situation we could say that it is not the court that has failed to do its
job, but rather X. According to this understanding, the duty to decide would
extend only to claims and arguments that have been put before the court in a
meaningful way. In any event, it seems indisputable that, even if a court can be
excused for electing not to do the parties’ work for them, there must come a
point where the parties have satisfied their participatory obligations with respect
23. See Fuller, supra note 9, at 388 (noting that “a perfect congruence between” the judge’s views
and the parties’ views is impossible to attain).
24. Anthony Kronman writes of this dynamic in terms of the occasional incommensurability of the
parties’ arguments. See ANTHONY M. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 339–40 (1993).
25. This would be the case if, for example, the court concluded that the conduct at issue could not
constitute consumer fraud as a matter of law.
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to an argument, thereby triggering the adjudicative duty.26
A court might also be viewed as having abdicated its adjudicative responsibilities even if it did not completely ignore troublesome aspects of a party’s
arguments, but rather glossed over or failed to consider them altogether. Here
imagine Plaintiff Y, who has brought a consumer fraud suit in the face of a line
of precedent that appears to establish that the general category of conduct the
defendant engaged in does not constitute consumer fraud. But Y asserts that the
conduct at issue in this case, even though it initially appears to fall within the
category exempted from liability, is different. What is more, Y accompanies that
assertion with a plausible account of the asserted difference and its significance
in terms of the broader aims of consumer fraud law. A court that affirmed a
grant of summary judgment against Y on the basis of the prior cases, and that
did so without giving proper consideration to Y’s assertion that this case is
distinct, might also be viewed as having breached its adjudicative duty.
The nature of “proper consideration” in such a case is, of course, subject to
dispute. Here, as in the case of a court that ignores an argument completely, we
confront a range of behavior. It would be one thing for the court to act as though
Y had not asserted a distinction between his case and those the court had
decided previously, another thing for the court to acknowledge the distinction
but dismiss it without consideration, and still another for it to misconstrue either
the nature of Y’s argument or the holdings of the prior cases. Here again, the
appropriate characterization of the court’s behavior may turn on the court’s
motivation for its actions. As in the case of a court that ignores a party’s
arguments in their entirety, a court in this second situation that acts out of
carelessness or a conscious result-orientation would almost certainly earn our
disapprobation.
But the court might have more noble purposes in mind. In the court’s
estimation, instead of “glossing over” certain aspects of Y’s arguments, it might
be “recharacterizing” the dispute based on a perception that the parties have
mischaracterized it either by misreading the law or relying on the wrong law
altogether.27 Thus the court may feel that the dispute between the parties is
better resolved according to an alternative set of rules—that what the court
regards as a tort case is best resolved according to tort law even if the parties
have argued it as if it were a contracts case, to use an extreme example. The
court may conclude that this is necessary simply to best serve the aim of doing
justice as between the parties. Alternatively, the court might fear that resolution
of the dispute according to the parties’ proposed criteria would result in the
creation of precedent that would operate to the detriment of the public by
introducing conflict and confusion in the applicable body of law. Depending on
26. I will leave any attempt to quantify the amount and nature of participation necessary to trigger
that duty for another day.
27. For an analysis of the appropriate judicial response to a case in which the court concludes that
the parties have “missed the point,” see Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L.
REV. 251 (2004).
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one’s conception of the relative prominence that dispute resolution and law
creation ought to play in the exercise of the judicial function,28 these motivations may or may not justify the court’s behavior. While there is thus room for
disagreement concerning precisely how and where the adjudicative duty ought
to extend in this latter category of cases, it nonetheless seems clear that at least
some portion of these cases involve unjustifiable judicial avoidance.
The discussion to this point has overlooked a significant complicating factor,
namely that there may be a distinction between the process of making a decision
and justifying that decision.29 Although readers of judicial opinions are accustomed to assuming that the reasons provided in an opinion are the actual reasons
for the court’s decision, that need not be the case (and in an important sense
cannot be the case).30 Thus the fact that the opinion in Defendant X’s case did
not speak to X’s First Amendment argument does not necessarily mean that the
court failed to consider that argument in deciding the case, only that it did not
disclose the content of its consideration. Here, too, one can imagine varying
motivations for the court’s behavior. The court might have concluded that X’s
argument was so frivolous as not to warrant consideration in the opinion. Or
perhaps the court felt that X’s conduct should not be protected, but found itself
unable to say why in a manner that fit within the constraints of existing doctrine,
and feared that any attempt to do so would create precedent susceptible to
misinterpretation or abuse. Relatedly, the court might have found X’s argument
to be entirely within the scope of First Amendment doctrine but nonetheless
have concluded that to sanction X’s conduct in this case would be to condone an
unacceptably broad range of conduct that the court believes should not be
protected. Each of these reasons arguably provides the court with a justification
for not fully articulating the reasons behind its decision, and one might therefore
conclude that even though the court’s opinion suggests a breach of the duty to
decide, the court’s actual behavior was consistent with the duty.
This raises both a theoretical problem and an empirical one. The theoretical
question is straightforward, at least in terms of what it asks, namely whether and
to what extent a court must disclose the bases of its decision. The empirical
question is somewhat less tractable, particularly if the adjudicative duty does
not include an obligation to elaborate on the decisional process. The difficulty
stems from the very nature of the problem. A court that violates the adjudicative
duty by definition leaves no readily accessible record of having done so.31
Nothing on the face of a judicial opinion will suggest that the court has
“ducked” an issue. To the contrary, prevailing stylistic norms require judicial
opinions to proceed as if both result and reasoning are the inevitable conse-

28. See infra text accompanying notes 48–51.
29. See infra Part II.B.3.
30. See infra Part II.D.
31. Cf. Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 378 (1997)
(noting the empirical problems involved in tracking the true bases of a court’s decision).
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quences of a mechanistic application of settled law.32 Any suggestion that the
court has done anything other than resolve the dispute put before it in a manner
consistent with this depiction is out of place. Thus, even if courts operate under
a duty to elaborate fully and candidly on the bases for their decisions, determining whether a court breached the duty would in most cases require an investment of nearly the same level of effort—reviewing the record and the briefs,
researching the law, and the like—necessary to properly decide the case in the
first instance. Absent evident flaws in a court’s treatment of a case, only that
level of investigation would reveal whether the court’s portrayal of what is at
stake accurately reflects the parties’ analyses or the underlying legal standards.
And if courts enjoy some degree of freedom to be less than fully candid in their
decisionmaking, determining whether a court has breached the duty would be
nearly if not completely impossible.
B. THE NEED TO DEFINE THE ADJUDICATIVE DUTY

At its most basic level, the case for defining the adjudicative duty seems
plain. Only when we understand what courts should do can we assess what they
actually do. To a large degree, the legitimacy of courts is a function of the
perception that judges are meeting the demands of their role in an appropriate
manner.33 The practical difficulties involved in assessing whether courts are
living up to their adjudicative responsibilities only underscore the necessity of
making the effort to more fully define those responsibilities. At least anecdotally, the practicing bar perceives that violations of the adjudicative duty—in all
of the various forms contained in the preceding impressionistic sketch—are
relatively common.34 Providing greater definition to the adjudicative duty will

32. “Opinions are overstated, rigid, seemingly inevitable. The rhetorical style is that of closure. The
judge is depicted as having little choice in the matter: the decisions are strongly constrained by the legal
materials.” Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 11
(1998) (citations omitted); see also Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 653
(1931) (“Opinions, then, disclose but little of how judges come to their conclusions. The opinions are
often ex post facto; they are censored expositions.”); Martin Shapiro, Judges As Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994) (arguing that “[l]ying is the nature of the judicial activity”); Simon, supra,
at 8–9 (summarizing the literature regarding the sense of certainty conveyed by judicial opinions and its
illusory nature). Lawrence Solan concluded from an analysis of Justice Cardozo’s opinions that not
even a judge as forthright as Cardozo was about the indeterminacy of law and the process of decision
was immune from writing decisions with a false sense of certainty. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE
OF JUDGES 22–27 (1993).
33. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1827–33 (2005) (discussing the “sociological legitimacy of courts and their decisions”); Penelope
Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging on the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1435, 1483–84 (2004) (discussing the relationship between perception and legitimacy in the context of
unpublished opinions); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189, 277–81
(2004) (discussing the importance of the perception of legitimacy for the proper functioning of a system
of procedure).
34. For example, the cases of Defendant X and Plaintiff Y used above are representative of actual
cases described to me by the lawyers involved. More broadly, I have discussed this problem with
lawyers engaged in varying practices before state and federal courts across the country, and nearly all
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not only help to inform that perception, but also enable judges to better
understand and fulfill the responsibilities of the judicial role.
In similar fashion, only with a full appreciation of what adjudication is meant
to accomplish can we properly address questions of institutional and procedural
design that arise as society’s demands on the judicial system evolve. The
rapidity and significance of change in the adjudicative landscape over the past
several decades has led to a situation in which theory has failed to keep pace
with practice.35 Thus, the absence of a past focus on the particulars of the
adjudicative duty can perhaps be explained as a product of the fact that,
traditionally, the very nature and structure of the courts, coupled with the
characteristics of the claims they were empowered to entertain, operated to
ensure that judges worked in rough accordance with the contours of the duty.36

can relate an instance in which they perceived that a court failed to adjudicate their case. None have
denied that adjudicative failures are common. Unsurprisingly, lawyers are unenthusiastic about making
such allegations for attribution. Equally unsurprisingly, Alan Dershowitz is an exception: “It is widely
known that many state court judges and some lower court federal judges play favorites among litigants
and lawyers. . . . I have seen it with my own eyes in the courts of Boston, New York, and elsewhere.”
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE 116 (2001).
There is, I recognize, some room for skepticism regarding such complaints. As Karl Llewellyn noted
in a related context forty-five years ago, “ever since lawyers began to lawyer, there have been losing
counsel aplenty who have so believed in their causes that they have bitterly blamed the court.” KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 3 (1960). The lawyers with whom I have
spoken might entertain views shaped by their experience as advocates for a particular view of the case,
which could easily render them incapable of assuming a neutral perspective, and thus unable to
perceive the appropriateness of the court’s resolution. But there are countervailing factors, too. Lawyers
face tremendous incentives not to make public allegations that a court has failed in its responsibilities.
Not only might lawyers believe it wise to “stay on the court’s good side,” particularly if they are likely
to appear before the same court again, but they might also fear being sanctioned if they are too
outspoken about suggesting that the court has failed in its responsibilities.
For recent examples of lawyers being disciplined for criticizing courts for failing to live up to
obligations falling within this Article’s conception of the adjudicative duty, see In re Wilkins, 777
N.E.2d 714 (Ind. 2002); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ohio 2003).
In Wilkins, the disciplined lawyer suggested that the opinion issued by an intermediate appellate court
was “so factually and legally inaccurate that one is left to wonder whether the Court of Appeals was
determined to find for [his client’s opponent] and then said whatever was necessary to reach that
conclusion (regardless of whether the facts or the law supported its decision).” 777 N.E.2d at 715–16.
In Gardner, the disciplined lawyer quite colorfully asserted, among other things, that an intermediate
appellate court failed to address the crux of his client’s arguments, and suggested that the judges were
motivated to do so by their past experiences as prosecutors. 793 N.E.2d at 427. See also Monroe H.
Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of Judges—A Proposed Solution to the
Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 729 (1997) (“The problem is not that too many lawyers are
publicly criticizing judges. Unfortunately, too few lawyers are willing to do so, even when a judge has
committed serious ethical violations and should be held accountable.”).
35. See generally Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J.
27 (2003) (arguing that some of the most significant current procedural controversies have arisen
because of a disconnect between theory and practice).
36. Indeed, Abram Chayes suggested that these “less tangible institutional factors” would hold the
judiciary in check in public law adjudication despite the fact that such cases in many ways require
judges to act in nontraditional ways. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1315. I explore these structural
effects in greater detail in Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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At the trial court level, appeal has long served as the primary mechanism for
policing judicial behavior, and throughout most of the existence of the American justice system litigants could expect that a judge who failed to decide their
case, whether partially or completely, and whether through intention or neglect,
would be brought back into line through an appeal. Yet the emergence of
“managerial judging” has resulted in a situation in which trial judges must
deeply involve themselves in cases in the pretrial stage, as a result of which they
are able to exercise considerable authority in ways that are beyond the reach of
appellate scrutiny.37 At the same time, appellate courts have systematically
narrowed the scope of their review over a wide range of issues, leaving
considerably greater discretion to trial courts and further diminishing the controls afforded by the appeal mechanism.38 At the appellate level, formal mechanisms such as en banc or discretionary review that might once have served to
enforce the duty are no longer up to the task.39 The informal constraints on
judicial behavior that arose from the design of the appellate process as historically implemented—such as oral argument and the process of opinion writing—
have likewise been diluted.40 These constraints have diminished at the same
time that the temptation to stray has grown stronger. Indeed, both phenomena
have been driven by the same fundamental cause: the massive increase in
appellate caseloads over the past half-century.41
Whatever one believes about the frequency with which the adjudicative duty
is violated, it is clear that the practical nature of adjudication has evolved to
become more conducive to violation. The decline in reversal rates in the federal
appellate courts over the past half-century is consistent with, and perhaps at
least partially explained by, an increase in inactivist conduct.42 Simply because
37. See Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 407 (1982) (noting that pretrial
conferences are informal and infrequently made public). Resnick observes:
As managers, judges learn more about cases much earlier than they did in the past. They
negotiate with parties about the course, timing, and scope of both pretrial and posttrial
litigation. These managerial responsibilities give judges greater power. Yet the restraints that
formerly circumscribed judicial authority are conspicuously absent. Managerial judges frequently work beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written,
reasoned opinions, and out of reach of appellate review.
Id. at 378.
38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 75 (1996).
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. See infra note 42.
42. The proportion of reversals among the total dispositions of the federal courts of appeals has
declined markedly over the past several decades. In 1960, the courts of appeal reversed 24.5 percent of
the cases those courts terminated on the merits. See DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS., ANNUAL
REPORT 210 tbl.B1 (1960) [hereinafter 1960 REPORT]. Looking back to 1945, one sees a reversal rate of
27.9 percent. See DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT 70 tbl.B1. (1945). But 1960 is
generally regarded as the year in which the dramatic changes in the business of the lower federal courts
began. See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts,
1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25 n.72. By 2003, the percentage of reversals had declined to 9.4. See ADMIN.
OFF. OF U.S. CTS., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 27 tbl.B-5 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 REPORT].
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judges are human, we might reasonably expect that some will take advantage of
the increased opportunities to avoid decisions that they would prefer not to
make. It may also be the case that, with less time to look for error, judges
consequently find less error.43 As Judge Posner pointedly notes, “the less time
an appellate court spends on a case the more likely it is simply to affirm the
district court or agency, affirmance being the easy way out.”44
As the next Part explores, adjudicative theory has had difficulty keeping in
step with these developments. Models of adjudication are formulated only to be
characterized as “outdated” a couple of decades later,45 and attempts at normative justification of these new paradigms of adjudication lag even further
behind.46 Amidst such constant change, important particulars are inevitably
overlooked. While it might in the past have seemed unnecessary to worry over
such particulars, simply because institutional design could be counted on to
encourage conduct in rough accordance with the adjudicative duty, that is no
longer the case. Instead, the evolution of the forms of adjudication and the
changes to the institutions in which it takes place have rendered inquiry into the
components of the duty important both in terms of calibrating institutional
design and in terms of developing the theory that drives the calibrating. My goal
in this Article is not to add yet another model, but rather to survey existing
models to determine whether they offer a consistent, or at least reconcilable, set
of answers regarding the contents and contours of the duty to decide, if indeed
such a duty exists at all.

Some, perhaps even most, of this phenomenon can be explained by changes in the composition of the
appellate caseload over that time period to include a greater proportion of meritless appeals, coupled
with the courts’ having deliberately narrowed the scope of appellate review to leave a greater
proportion of issues to the discretion of trial courts. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 77 (concluding that
the portion of difficult cases on the federal appellate docket has been decreasing). But the decline in the
reversal rate occurred alongside a rapid increase in the aggregate volume of cases before the courts of
appeal, which faced more than fifteen times as many appeals in 2003 as in 1960, compare 1960 REPORT,
supra, at 210 tbl.B1 (showing 3,899 cases commenced in the courts of appeal), with 2003 REPORT,
supra, at 23 tbl.B-1 (showing 60,661 cases commenced in the courts of appeal), without a proportional
increase in the number of judges. The statistics relating to appellate caseloads in the state courts are not
as well-developed, but in general the same sort of upward trend is evident. See, e.g., Thomas B.
Marvell, Is There an Appeal from the Caseload Deluge?, JUDGES’ J., Summer 1985, at 34, 36–37 (noting
between 1973 and 1983, appeals in state courts increased at a rate double that of trial court filings).
43. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1290, 1291 (1996) (“It is, of course, difficult to show that the outcome of any appeal
would be different if the judges had considered the case more carefully, but there is circumstantial
evidence suggesting that at least some results would change.”).
44. POSNER, supra note 38, at 74–75. Judge Posner is, at a minimum, skeptical of this as the primary
or even a significant explanation for the decline in reversal rates, concluding instead that the appellate
docket has evolved to include a smaller proportion of difficult cases. Id. at 75–77.
45. See Molot, supra note 35, at 29–30 (observing that changes in the practical nature of litigation
have outpaced the development of models of adjudication); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation
and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 647, 692–94 (1988) (discussing how litigation and
adjudicative theory have advanced past Chayes’s portrayal).
46. See infra note 142.
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II. A SURVEY OF MODELS OF ADJUDICATION
As the discussion to this point suggests, the concept of an adjudicative duty is
easy to grasp in the abstract, but difficult to pin down in its particulars. A major
difficulty with attempting to draw conclusions about the necessary components
of an adjudicative duty is that, even when the inquiry is limited to the American
system, there is no pre-existing, fixed concept of adjudication, or of its functions, against which to assess alternative forms. Adjudication is a social construct created to serve different needs in different times and places and subject
to continual modification as the needs of society evolve.47 In an ultimate sense,
then, efforts to characterize variations on judicial practice as either consistent or
inconsistent with the essence of adjudication run a serious risk of futility. To an
extent, adjudication simply is what it is, suggesting that an adjudicative duty
must be defined tautologically, if at all. One response to the changes in the
practical nature of adjudication in the American system over the past halfcentury, then, might be to conclude that the nature of the duty (to the extent that
“duty” even remains an appropriate term) has undergone corresponding changes.
The normative basis for expecting a great deal from our courts may have
vanished right alongside the courts’ ability to deliver on that expectation.
Surely, however, this overstates the case. Despite the contingent character of
adjudication, it is possible to identify certain points of fundamental agreement
from which to begin the task of defining the adjudicative duty. Contemporary
discussions of adjudicative theory in the American judicial system assume two
general goals for that system. The first and arguably most fundamental is
providing a peaceful method of dispute resolution.48 Satisfaction of this goal
requires primarily that disputes be settled, with perhaps an implicit subsidiary
requirement that the process of settlement be “fair.”49 This function supports the
47. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1911–12 (2001) (“What we know as the judicial power does not inhabit an
immutable, autonomous sphere of public power, but instead is associated in complex, contingent ways
with legal rules, institutional design, and everyday practice.”). Indeed, to take just one example, the
nature of appellate review within the American system has changed considerably over the course of the
nation’s history. See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 35–38
(1990) (exploring the differences between modern appellate review and the systems in place at the time
of the framing of the Constitution).
48. See Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937–38 (1975);
Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 303–06
(1989). Martin Shapiro suggests that the conflict resolution triad—“[T]hat whenever two persons come
into a conflict they cannot themselves solve, one solution appealing to common sense is to call upon a
third for assistance in achieving a resolution.”—is the basis of courts’ social logic and political
legitimacy. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1981). Shapiro also
identifies a conceptually distinct social control function, which operates via a courts’ imposition on the
parties of a pre-existing set of rules embodying societal interests. Id. at 17–18, 26. In practice, he notes,
this function is “almost inevitably intertwined” with the dispute-resolution function. Id. at 18.
49. See Scott, supra note 48, at 937 (“To facilitate acceptance of the outcome and resort to the
process, the rules should be seen as ‘fair’ in terms of prevailing community values, but notions of what
is fair may vary a great deal from one era or society to another. Such variations are of only secondary
importance; it is more important for society that the dispute be settled peaceably than that it be settled
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imposition of some form of duty to decide, at least in the sense that consistent
failure to resolve disputes would threaten the very basis of the system by
encouraging litigants to seek resolution elsewhere. The second goal is lawmaking: the creation of norms to govern the future conduct of parties beyond the
immediate adjudication.50 Here the implications for an adjudicative duty are
less clear. Courts make law in the course of resolving disputes, but this has no
necessary prescriptive consequence for the manner in which any given case is
resolved. Indeed, there is a tension between dispute resolution and law creation
because, at least insofar as a court must give reasons for its decision and be
bound by them in subsequent cases, the resolution of a specific dispute may
give rise to law the court would prefer not to create.
The tension between these two goals underlies much of the variance among
models of adjudication.51 The remainder of this Part provides an overview of
the dominant models of adjudication—the “classic” and “public law” models—
and their interrelation. In so doing, I hope to achieve two aims. First, I aim to
highlight the normative implications of both models for the formulation (or
degradation, as the case may be) of a duty to decide. The two models themselves are not, of course, inherently authoritative sources. They are, however,
strongly suggestive evidence of the essential nature of adjudication in the
American system and thus serve as useful points of reference for the analysis.
Second, I aim to focus on the extent of the descriptive and normative changes in
the judicial role, as reflected in both models, and to reinforce the claim that
inquiry into the existence and precise contours of a duty to decide is more
timely than ever.
This Part concludes by taking up the topic of judicial candor, which concerns
the relationship between a court’s public statement of the reasons behind a
decision and the actual reasons behind the decision. Consideration of this
relationship has been largely absent from the classic and public law literature.
Yet, because judicial opinions provide nearly the exclusive basis for monitoring
in any particular way.”); Sward, supra note 48, at 304 (“[I]f the goal were simply to resolve conflicts, it
could be achieved by allowing a judge to flip a coin. . . . Obviously, however, such a system would not
be seen as fair: Victory would depend solely on a random event. Citizens would not voluntarily submit
to such a system.”).
50. See Scott, supra note 48, at 938–40 (describing what he calls the “Behavior Modification
Model”); Sward, supra note 48, at 306–08 (separating out and describing the rulemaking and behavior
modification goals).
51. Indeed, it would be possible to develop pure-form models based on these goals—one a pure
dispute resolution model and the other a pure law-creation model. Such models would serve largely as
caricatures, however, since there is general agreement that both functions play some role in adjudication, with the relative prominence of the respective goals standing as the basis of differences among the
models. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 1–7 (1985) (dividing adjudicative theories into “arbitration” and “regulation” models based
on the relative prominence of the dispute-resolution and law-creation functions, and assessing the
relationship between them). This tension has, in turn, defined the formulation of justiciability doctrines.
See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV.
603, 625–36 (1992) (tracing the tension between the “dispute resolution” and “public values” models
and its implications for justiciability doctrine).

2005]

DEFINING JUDICIAL INACTIVISM

139

judicial behavior, it (or, alternatively, “the relationship”) must be addressed in
the context of any effort to delineate courts’ minimal adjudicative obligations.
A. THE CLASSIC MODEL OF ADJUDICATION

As its name suggests, the classic model is associated with a vision of
adjudication in its quintessential form, involving the resolution of a private
dispute between private parties. This section focuses on the version of the
classic model formulated by Lon Fuller and refined by Melvin Eisenberg, as
well as a related model of adjudication-as-representation developed by Christopher Peters. Fuller’s model provides an appropriate starting point for the
analysis because of its focus on party participation and relatively welldeveloped consideration of the ways adjudication must be structured to best
accommodate and facilitate that participation. Peters’s model, in turn, provides a
connection between party participation and the lawmaking function of adjudication that is largely absent from Fuller’s model.
1. Lon Fuller’s Participation Thesis
Perhaps the most prominent formulation of the classic model of adjudication
is that articulated by Lon Fuller in a posthumously published article, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication.52 Fuller argues that “the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar
form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned
arguments for a decision in his favor.”53 Thus, from Fuller’s perspective, the
crucial question to ask concerning any proposed feature of adjudication is
whether it adversely affects this mode of participation.54 In his own words,
“Whatever heightens the significance of this participation lifts adjudication
toward its optimum expression. Whatever destroys the meaning of that participation destroys the integrity of adjudication itself.”55
From this starting point,56 which Melvin Eisenberg calls “the Participation

52. Fuller, supra note 9.
53. Id. at 364.
54. Id. at 382.
55. Id. at 364.
56. As Owen Fiss notes, Fuller simply postulated this characterization of adjudication without
explaining its basis. See Fiss, supra note 10, at 42 (“[A]lthough much of the essay rightly celebrates the
role of reason in human affairs, and sees the important connection between reason and adjudication,
there is no explanation of why reason requires the kind of individual participation that Fuller insists
upon.”); see also Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits
of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1730 (1992) (“[T]he opportunity to present proofs and
reasoned arguments and the rationality of decision are not as intricately tied together as Fuller
suggests.”). Robert Bone suggests that Fuller’s focus on participation was instrumental, arising primarily from Fuller’s belief that “individual participation through reasoned argument in an adversarial
format was the institutional form that made it possible for courts to develop sound principles and render
good decisions.” Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy
Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1303 (1995).
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Thesis,”57 Fuller derives several related conclusions relevant to the discussion
here. First, the centrality of reasoned argument to the adjudicative process
requires that decisions made in response to those arguments must likewise
“meet the test of reason.”58 Second, while Fuller concludes that maintaining the
integrity of the adjudicative process does not necessarily require that the
decisionmaker provide reasons for its decision, he also suggests that integrity is
enhanced by the issuance of opinions setting forth those reasons.59 This is so
because the issuance of an opinion helps to ensure the litigants that their
participation was not illusory, and that the reasons and proofs they offered were
actually considered by the decisionmaker.60 Finally, while he concedes the
impossibility of achieving complete correspondence between the parties’ and
the decisionmaker’s view of the issues, with the result that the decision will
almost always rest, at least to some degree, on grounds other than those argued
by the parties, he cautions that “this is no excuse for a failure to work toward an
achievement of the closest approximation of it.”61 If such correspondence is
absent, “then the adjudicative process has become a sham, for the parties’
participation in the decision has lost all meaning.”62
Fuller’s model thus calls for the judiciary to assume a passive role pursuant to
which judges restrict themselves as much as possible to reacting to the parties’
arguments. He cautions, for instance, against the initiation of proceedings by the
judiciary—on the grounds that the mere act of initiation would lead to preconceptions, which in turn would reduce the effectiveness of party participation.63
More broadly, the general goal of maximizing the significance of party participation requires the court to adopt a posture of responsiveness rather than proactiveness.
Eisenberg, in a companion article to Forms and Limits, identifies three norms
that emerge from Fuller’s arguments.64 First, the norm of attention requires the
decisionmaker to “attend to what the parties have to say.”65 Second, the norm of
explanation requires the decisionmaker to “explain his decision in a manner that
provides a substantive reply to what the parties have to say.”66 Third, the norm
of strong responsiveness requires that the resulting decision “be strongly responBone also posits that Fuller believed there was symbolic value in participation, as well as an intrinsic
value to party control of lawsuits. Id.
57. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An
Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 411 (1978).
58. Fuller, supra note 9, at 366–67.
59. Id. at 387–88.
60. Id. at 388 (“A less obvious point is that, where a decision enters into some continuing
relationship, if no reasons are given the parties will almost inevitably guess at reasons and act
accordingly.”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 385–86.
64. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 411–12.
65. Id. at 411.
66. Id. at 412.
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sive to the parties’ proofs and arguments in the sense that it should proceed from
and be congruent with those proofs and arguments.”67
Eisenberg proceeds to analyze the relationship of these norms to the dispute
resolution and lawmaking functions of adjudication. The norm of attention, he
concludes, serves both functions.68 Although Eisenberg does not expand on this
assertion, his reasoning is presumably that, unless the court attends to the
parties’ arguments, it cannot fully comprehend their dispute, and that without
such comprehension, true resolution is impossible. Similarly, with respect to the
lawmaking function, the court cannot effectively make law to govern similar
future disputes without a full appreciation of the nature of the dispute before it.
As we will soon see, the court may ultimately determine that the parties’
arguments do not suggest the appropriate grounds on which to formulate a legal
standard and may thus render a decision that is not strongly responsive to those
arguments.69 Nonethelesss, the Participation Thesis requires that the court give
the parties’ arguments careful attention.
Eisenberg reasons that the norm of explanation, in contrast, is more critical to
the lawmaking function than to dispute resolution.70 That is not to say that
explanation is valueless for purposes of dispute resolution—by giving the losing
party reasons for the result, the decisionmaker provides that party with a basis
for concluding that the process was not arbitrary, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the courts and facilitating their ability to effectively and finally resolve
disputes. Explanation provides the related benefit of furnishing evidence that the
decisionmaker has fulfilled the norm of attention. But explanation is especially
critical to the lawmaking function simply because it would be difficult for law
to emerge from adjudication unless the adjudicator provides reasons for the
result it has reached.71
Eisenberg’s most significant gloss on Fuller is his conclusion that strong
responsiveness does not follow naturally from the Participation Thesis but
rather “is an independent norm which both helps define adjudication and gives a
special meaning to participation through proofs and arguments.”72 He reasons
that party participation alone is not what defines adjudication, suggesting that
there are other forms of social ordering—such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, which he identifies as an example of a “consultative process”73—in which
parties enjoy the right to present proofs and reasoned arguments to a decisionmaker.74 In the adjudicative process, he reasons, it is also critical for the

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 75–79.
70. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 412.
71. Id. (“[R]ules ordinarily cannot emerge from an outcome unless the reasons for that outcome are
given.”).
72. Id. at 413.
73. Id. at 414–15, 418.
74. Id. at 412.
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resulting decision to arise out of and be connected to the parties’ proofs and
arguments. Strong responsiveness is thus essential to the dispute resolution
function of adjudication, because only if the court’s decision is responsive to the
parties’ arguments will it resolve the dispute that the parties seek to have
resolved.75
Strong responsiveness, however, stands in tension with the lawmaking function, for the simple reason that whatever rules the court generates as a result of
its resolution of the specific dispute before it must be of the sort that can be
applied to similar disputes in the future.76 If the dispute before the court is
somehow not representative of the broader category of disputes of which it is a
part, or if the parties’ arguments fail to address issues that are critical to the
formulation of a rule that must be applied across a range of future disputes, then
strong responsiveness could lead to a decision that is based on an incomplete set
of inputs and thus generate law that is inappropriate to the needs of future
disputants. As a consequence, Eisenberg would excuse departures from strong
responsiveness in public law cases,77 which by their very nature have immediate implications extending well beyond the parties before the court.78
Even so, Eisenberg concludes that courts should feel obligated to work
toward as close an approximation of congruence between the parties’ arguments
and the rationale for the court’s decision as possible.79 Indeed, as Eisenberg’s
reference to public law cases suggests, strong responsiveness may only be in
real tension with a conception of the lawmaking function that allows for and
encourages courts to generate broad rules intended to provide general guidance
over a range of situations extending well beyond the situation presented by the
dispute before the court. A minimalist conception of the lawmaking function, in
contrast, can coexist peacefully with strong responsiveness. “Judicial minimalism” calls for courts to focus on resolving the cases before them, avoiding to the
extent possible statements of abstract principle and other matters not critical to
the resolution of the dispute.80 If courts consistently follow this recipe, a prior
court’s strong responsiveness to the misplaced or incomplete arguments of the
parties will not hamper the resolution of subsequent cases, since the subsequent
court will be able to distinguish away the prior decision.

75. Id. at 413; see also EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 4 (suggesting that, in fulfilling the dispute
resolution function, “a court is limited to action that is responsive to the claim made”).
76. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 413–14.
77. Id. at 427–28.
78. See infra Part I.B.2.
79. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 413–14.
80. “A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves many things undecided. . . . It knows
that there is much that it does not know; it is intensely aware of its own limitations. It seeks to decide
cases on narrow grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT ix (1999); see also Christopher J. Peters, Assessing
the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1459–61 (2000) (describing the minimalist
conception of judging).
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2. Adjudication as Representation
A common critique of Fuller’s model is that it fails to provide an adequate
link between its emphasis on elevating the significance of party participation
and the proper functioning of courts.81 Indeed, insofar as rational decisionmaking is taken to be at the heart of adjudication, this is an apt criticism, since
participation does not guarantee rationality, and rationality does not require
participation.82 And, as Eisenberg acknowledges, in at least some instances the
fulfillment of both the dispute-resolution and law-creation functions can only be
properly accomplished through the consideration of interests beyond those of
the parties before the court.
There are, however, other justifications for emphasizing party participation in
a classic model of adjudication.83 One such justification is provided by Christopher Peters’s theory of adjudication as representation.84 Peters does not seek to
provide a comprehensive theory of adjudication, but instead to justify judicial
lawmaking by challenging the common view of adjudication as inherently
nondemocratic. He argues that two fundamental, yet overlooked, features of
adjudicative lawmaking provide it with considerably more democratic legitimacy than traditionally understood. The first is the fact that judicial decisions
are not constructed out of whole cloth by judges, but instead proceed from the
proofs and arguments presented by the parties.85 That is to say, what emerges
from the adjudicative process is not the product merely of the judge, “but rather
of a process of participation and debate among the parties to the case . . . .”86

81. See supra note 56; text accompanying notes 76–78.
82. See Tidmarsh, supra note 56, at 1730, 1735–38.
83. I focus on Peters’s theory because it provides an express link between participation and judicial
lawmaking. It is hardly the only justification of participation as an integral component of adjudication.
For a recent example, see Larry Solum’s “participatory legitimacy thesis”:
Because a right of participation must be afforded to those to be bound by judicial proceedings
in order for those proceedings to serve as a legitimate source of authority, the value of
participation cannot be reduced to a function of the effect of participation on outcomes; nor
can the value of participation be reduced to a subjective preference or feeling of satisfaction.
Solum, supra note 33, at 275. Solum, however, expressly disclaims any attempt to justify judicial
lawmaking, focusing instead “on the core case of civil adjudication—the case in which the general
rules are fixed and application is the focus of the adjudicative process.” Id. at 242.
84. See generally Peters, supra note 31.
85. Id. at 347.
86. Id. Martin Shapiro echoes this interpretation: “More often than not what we would label as
adversary proceedings are rituals in which three law speakers, the judge and the two parties or their
attorneys, speak on until arriving at some verbal formulation of the law synthesized from their various
versions.” SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 13. Even so, Shapiro does not connect this dynamic with the
legitimacy of judicial lawmaking but rather with facilitation of the dispute-resolution function, suggesting that:
[M]ost of the conventional attachment to adversary proceedings is based not on the desire to
heighten the level of conflict in judicial proceedings, but quite the opposite, on the need to
have both parties present before the judge if he is to have any chance of creating a resolution
to which both parties will consent. Every effort is made to preserve the appearance that both
parties voluntarily come before the court.
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This limits a court’s decisional options and leads to outputs that resemble those
generated by democratic legislatures, which likewise act on the basis of participation and debate among those likely to be affected by a statute.87 The second
feature concerns the nature of precedent. Law generated in one judicial decision
prospectively binds others not party to that decision only in proportion to the
degree of congruence between the situation that led to the decision and any
subsequent situation to which the decision might be applied. As a result, later
litigants will only be bound by a prior decision if, and to the extent that, prior
litigants can meaningfully be said to have put the interests of the later litigants
before the court. “The parties to precedential cases thus can be said to serve as
interest representatives of subsequent litigants in much the same way that we
expect our elected legislators to serve as interest representatives of their constituents.”88
Peters identifies three conditions as being necessary to the proper functioning
of adjudication as representation. According to Peters:
The first general condition is . . . more or less a restatement of the features
thought necessary by Fuller in order for adjudication in its core sense to exist:
the parties must be allowed to take the lead in shaping the litigation through
the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments, and the court’s decision
must (in Professor Eisenberg’s paraphrase) actually “proceed from and be
congruent with [the parties’] proofs and arguments.”89

The greater the departure from strong responsiveness, the lesser the democratic
legitimacy of the decision. The second condition is that courts must apply stare
decisis correctly, such that prior decisions bind subsequent parties only to the
extent the subsequent parties are similarly situated to the original litigants or the
subsequent parties are afforded the opportunity to participate in the decision to
extend the precedent.90 According to the third condition, the parties who
litigated the precedential case must have done so adequately.91
Consistent with these conditions, Peters advocates the strict application of
justiciability doctrines in most contexts to ensure that litigants “have a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome to produce a legitimately binding rule.”92 Peters

Id. at 12–13.
Indeed, Owen Fiss offers a similar dynamic as a justification for the judicial role in public law
litigation, noting that a “judge is entitled to exercise power only after he has participated in a dialogue
about the meaning of the public values.” Fiss, supra note 10, at 13.
87. Peters, supra note 31, at 347.
88. Id. at 347.
89. Id. at 375.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 376.
92. Id. at 428. Peters acknowledges that in some instances “reasons not connected with democratic
legitimacy” might compel the relaxation of the personal stake requirement. Id. at 425. He also
acknowledges the need for ensuring broad participation in public law cases. Id. at 417–19.

2005]

DEFINING JUDICIAL INACTIVISM

145

further argues that the proper functioning of adjudication as representation
requires rejection of the so-called “passive virtues,” pursuant to which courts
rely on doctrines like justiciability to avoid decisions that they conclude are, for
prudential reasons, best left until another time.93 Resort to the passive virtues is
problematic for Peters not only because such avoidance has an effect on the
parties—namely, maintenance of the status quo—but also because it amounts to
a decision that does not proceed from the proofs and arguments of the parties
and in fact precludes the presentation of proofs and arguments.94 He acknowledges the possibility that a court might confront a case it would prefer not to
decide out of a concern that the parties before it are not representative of the
large class of potential litigants that would be affected by the decision. The
court might therefore be tempted to defer adjudication on the issue involved
until a later case with more appropriate parties.95 Peters rejects this, however, in
favor of decisional minimalism. Courts confronted with such a case should not
avoid adjudication, but instead should decide the case on the narrowest available grounds. As a result, such courts can ensure that if the initial parties turn
out to be as unrepresentative as the court perceived, subsequent courts will be
able to distinguish the prior decision and thus limit the decision’s scope.96
B. THE PUBLIC LAW MODEL

The classic model of adjudication is often contrasted with the “public law”
model, typically associated with Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss.97 Chayes
introduced the model in his famous 1976 article The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation.98 Chayes’s project is largely descriptive—it begins with the
observation that much of the adjudication then taking place in the federal courts
was inconsistent with the classic model and indeed from the perspective of that
model may be “recognizable as a lawsuit only because it takes place in a
courtroom before an official called a judge.”99 Chayes observes that “[p]erhaps
the dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not
arise out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead, the
object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies.”100
While the paradigm case under the classic model might be a tort suit between

93. See BICKEL, supra note 5, at 111–98.
94. Peters, supra note 31, at 416–17.
95. Id. at 416.
96. Id. at 416–17.
97. Chayes, supra note 10; Fiss, supra note 10. For examples of works treating the models as
contrasting, see Molot, supra note 35, at 34–37; Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1382–1403 (1991). Chayes and Fiss were by no means the only ones
addressing the topic. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 656 (observing that there was already an emerging
body of scholarship concerning public law litigation at the time Chayes’s article appeared).
98. Chayes, supra note 10.
99. Id. at 1302.
100. Id. at 1284. Although Chayes confines his analysis to federal civil litigation, he notes his belief
that a similar evolution away from the classic model has occurred in state courts. Id. at 1284 n.12.
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two private parties, under the public law model it involves an effort at institutional reform conducted on behalf of a group of plaintiffs, as would be the case
in school desegregation or prison reform litigation. The tort suit would involve a
focused, historical inquiry into a discrete event. Nearly every question raised
would relate to a past happening: how the defendant acted, whether that action
was appropriate, and to what extent the plaintiff was damaged. The institutional
reform case, in contrast, while perhaps triggered by a discrete past event—such
as an instance of police brutality or the refusal to admit a black student to a
school—requires inquiry, as Fiss puts it, into “a social condition that threatens
important constitutional values and the organizational dynamic that creates and
perpetuates that condition.”101 This requires a shift in focus away from what has
happened toward what might happen and away from the “finding” of “adjudicative” fact toward the “evaluation” of “legislative” fact.102
All of this involves a dramatic reorientation of the judicial role. In a “morphology” of the public law model, Chayes identifies eight respects in which public
law litigation is wholly distinct from the classic model:
(1) The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped primarily
by the court and parties.
(2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous.
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predicative and
legislative.
(4) Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form
logically derived from the substantive liability and confined in its impact
to the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc
on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences for many persons including absentees.
(5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated.
(6) The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair: its
administration requires the continuing participation of the court.
(7) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and statement of
the governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for
credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litigation to
ensure a just and viable outcome.
(8) The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public
policy.103

101. Fiss, supra note 10, at 18.
102. Chayes, supra note 10, at 1297.
103. Id. at 1302.
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Although Chayes remains largely agnostic regarding the legitimacy of adjudication according to the public law model, he does venture into normative
territory to articulate some of the institutional advantages that courts might
enjoy vis-à-vis the political branches in confronting institutional reform.104 One
such advantage stems from institutional competence. Chayes suggests that,
contrary to the traditional belief that agencies and legislatures are better equipped
for fact-gathering than courts, courts benefit from the adversarial structure.
Though diluted in public law litigation, the adversarial structure provides the
parties with incentives to furnish the court with relevant information.105 And
since even the relatively sprawling disputes at the heart of public law cases
nonetheless are tied to a specific situation, the adversarial process allows for a
depth of focus less likely to be achieved in a more generalized legislative or
administrative inquiry.106 Another advantage stems from the judiciary’s relative
inability to avoid confronting a grievance. Chayes asserts that, “[u]nlike an
administrative bureaucracy or a legislature, the judiciary must respond to the
complaints of the aggrieved.”107
Fiss took up the topic some three years later. He provides a descriptive
account of what he refers to as “structural reform” litigation that in broad form
parallels Chayes’s description of public law litigation.108 Fiss’s more significant
contribution is to articulate a normative justification for the revised judicial role
in public law cases. At the operational level, he contends that a more proactive
judge is necessary to counter representational deficiencies that are much more
likely to surface in public law cases. Because the named plaintiff in an institu-

104. As Jay Tidmarsh observes, while Chayes may have succeeded in justifying the enhanced
judicial role in public law litigation relative to the political branches of government, he did not
“demonstrate the normative legitimacy of the judge’s power with respect to the jury, the parties, and the
lawyers. Given that litigation over public rights is inevitable, why should the judge, and not the other
players in the litigation enterprise, be the ones to shape the political-juridical debate?” Tidmarsh, supra
note 56, at 1721–22. The judicial branch is:
a “messy admixture” of litigants, interested bystanders, juries, lawyers, and judges. The
assertion by judges of additional powers often comes at the expense of at least one of these
other participants, thus invoking concerns of autonomy (when the traditional rights of parties
and bystanders are altered), democratic participation (when the traditional role of the jury is
disturbed), and adversarial procedure (when the role of the lawyers is reduced).
Id. at 1722 n.168.
105. Chayes, supra note 10, at 1308.
106. Id.
107. Id. Chayes identified six such institutional advantages in total. The other four are: (1) that the
process is presided over by a judge, whose professional tradition and practical background are likely to
have acquainted him with a wide range of policy problems, and whose idealized role requires
dispassionate analysis; (2) that the use of litigation as a vehicle for institutional reform allows for ad
hoc experimentation in discrete settings, as well as the flexibility to adapt as circumstances and
experience dictate; (3) that, even in the public law model, litigation allows for a great deal of
participation in the process by those who will be affected by its outcome; and (4) because the judiciary
is not bureaucratic, it enjoys greater flexibility to assemble (and later disassemble) task forces to
address specific problems on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 1307–09.
108. See Fiss, supra note 10, at 18–28.
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tional reform suit is only one member of the larger group affected by the
litigation, there is greater reason to be concerned that she will not adequately
represent the interests of that group.109 She may not share the group’s concerns,
either because she has different priorities, or because she does not take a
sufficiently broad view of the interests that might be affected. And if she does
not appropriately conceive of the problem underlying the litigation, she might
compound these deficiencies by failing to name the appropriate parties as
defendants, thereby compromising the adequacy of representation on both
sides.110 This could happen if, for example, the plaintiff in a school desegregation suit fails to see segregation as the product of both housing and school
policies and brings only the school board into court.111 As a result of these
dangers, it is no longer appropriate for the judge merely to react to the issues
raised by the nominal parties to the litigation. Instead, the judge must take this
greater array of interests into account. In some instances, this may require the
judge to “construct a broader representational framework” by getting more
parties involved, appointing special masters, and the like.112 In every instance, it
will require the judge to adopt a broader perspective and take a more proactive
approach.
But Fiss does not stop there. Instead, he argues for an even broader conception of the judicial role. For him, the classic model of adjudication—which he
takes as conceiving of dispute resolution as the primary function of courts—
fails to capture the essence of the judicial role. Rather than existing merely to
resolve disputes—which Fiss disparages as “an extravagant use of public
resources”113—“courts exist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve
disputes. Constitutional adjudication is the most vivid manifestation of this
function, but it also seems true of most civil and criminal cases, certainly now
and perhaps for most of our history as well.”114 Indeed, for this reason Fiss
elects not to join Chayes in using the “public law” label. To Fiss, “all rights
enforced by courts are public.”115 Thus Fiss places a considerably greater
emphasis on the lawmaking function of courts than on dispute resolution,

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26. Chayes noted this as well:

The judge is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case, and he draws for support
not only on the parties and their counsel, but on a wide range of outsiders—masters, experts,
and oversight personnel. Most important, the trial judge has increasingly become the creator
and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on persons
not before the court and require the judge’s continuing involvement in administration and
implementation.
Chayes, supra note 10, at 1284.
113. Fiss, supra note 10, at 30.
114. Id. at 29.
115. Id. at 35–36.
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particularly in the sense of strongly responsive dispute resolution as envisioned
in the Fuller/Eisenberg model.116
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PUBLIC LAW AND CLASSIC MODELS

Two purposes animate this Article’s exploration of the classic and public law
models of adjudication. The first is simply to explore the features of adjudication that the various models deem fundamental and to ascertain the values
underlying the elevation of those features to fundamental status. Only with a
clear sense of what adjudication is meant to achieve and which features of
adjudication are critical to its doing so will it be possible to assess whether an
adjudicative duty exists and, if so, to take the additional step of defining its
contours. The second purpose is to consider the nature and extent of any
commonalities between the models. If the models’ prescriptions diverge so far
as to require fundamentally different judicial orientations, it may not be possible
to formulate an adjudicative duty without first selecting one model over the
other. If, on the other hand, there are appropriate points of fundamental agreement between the models, an adjudicative duty might be formulated independent of any need to privilege one model’s conception of the judicial role. As I
hope to demonstrate in this section, the latter formulation is the more accurate.
Whatever the relation between the models, they share certain fundamental
conceptions upon which it is possible to ground an adjudicative duty.
There is no canonical formulation of the public law model. As Richard
Marcus observes, “[t]here is a real problem in deciding what public law is,
popular though the concept may be.”117 Thus it is impossible to state with
certainty what the relationship between the classic and public law models is,
even if one takes Fuller as having set forth the authoritative formulation of the
classic model. It is, however, possible to sketch out three broad conceptualizations of the relationship. And it is also important in the context of a search for a
core adjudicative duty to bear in mind the commonalities between the models,
despite their divergent theoretical heritage.
1. Distinct Models of Distinct Phenomena
One view of the relationship between the two models would assert that they
describe distinct phenomena. Certainly, if one takes the position that “public
law” represents a category apart from the run of “private” rights enforced by
courts, involving only those cases seeking to enforce constitutional or statutory
policies against governmental institutions, this is a viable distinction. Indeed,
this is largely the concept that Chayes uses to set apart public law litigation
from traditional litigation.118 One might also extend the concept a bit further to
include other cases that manifest many or all of the features of public law
116. See Bone, supra note 56, at 1275 (contrasting Fuller’s theory with the public law model).
117. Marcus, supra note 45, at 670.
118. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1302.
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litigation even if they are not based on “public law” in this restricted sense.119
Under either concept, one could credibly argue that while expansions of the
concept of adjudication and notions of the proper judicial role are appropriate in
the limited context of such cases, they ought not be extended more broadly to
traditional litigation. Thus Fuller’s model might remain appropriate, both descriptively and normatively, for traditional, bipolar litigation involving private rights
such as a classic contract or tort suit. At the same time, the public law model
may provide better guidance in cases with public law features, including those
having direct implications for non-parties, such as suits to reform public housing authorities or to compel enforcement of environmental regulations.120
Regardless of one’s assessment of the theoretical appeal of such an understanding of the relationship, it appears inaccurate as a description of what has
actually taken place. Chayes notes his impression that much of what he described appeared not only in public law litigation, but in other contexts as
well.121 And even if Chayes’s impressions were mistaken, subsequent developments have made it clear that judges “applied the lessons they had learned from
their public law litigation experiences outside that realm.”122 While one could
certainly argue that judges ought to tailor their roles to the nature of the
litigation before them, plainly that is not what has happened.
2. The Public Law Model as Descriptive of a Paradigm Shift
Another approach to the relationship would be to take the public law model
as emblematic of a fundamental shift in the nature of the judicial role. Whether
for reasons related to the increased governmental role in society123 or otherwise,
the role of courts may have evolved to include a relatively greater emphasis on,
in Fiss’s phrasing, “giving meaning to our public values.”124 According to this
view, while adjudication might look more or less unchanged on a superficial
level, its purpose and therefore the judicial orientation may have changed.
While the business of courts would still involve the application and articulation
of law in the context of relatively concrete factual situations, the emphasis

119. Indeed, Chayes seemed willing to accept this possibility, id. at 1302–03, and as the next section
will show, such a view underlies at least a portion of post-public-law theorizing. See infra Part II.C.
120. Meir Dan-Cohen advocates one such “view of adjudication as a more heterogeneous institution,
assuming different forms and discharging different functions in various contexts.” Dan-Cohen, supra
note 51, at 5. His specific focus is on the implications of the increasing prominence and prevalence of
large-scale organizations for the appropriate conception of adjudication.
121. Chayes, supra note 10, at 1315.
122. Marcus, supra note 45, at 675. Marcus opines that “[t]he features of public law litigation that
prompted judicial efforts to control litigation cannot meaningfully be limited to that kind of litigation.”
Id. “Having found a significant public interest in most civil litigation, judges reacted by taking charge
of ordinary cases in a way somewhat similar to that in which they had taken control of the cases Chayes
described.” Id.
123. Chayes traces out how this may have developed. Chayes, supra note 10, at 1285; see also
Dan-Cohen, supra note 51, at 4 (discussing the view that there was or is currently underway a transition
from a dispute resolution model to a public law model).
124. Fiss, supra note 10, at 31.
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would be on the law rather than on the appropriate resolution of the precise
dispute before the court. The question, under this view, is not: “What are the
mechanisms that will best facilitate resolution of this dispute between these
parties?” Rather, the question is: “What is the best way to bring public values to
bear on this situation?”
Fiss clearly takes the position that the appropriate judicial orientation is
toward the implementation of public values, although he questions whether this
view came about by evolution or is simply a more-or-less accurate account of
the way adjudication has always been.125 In his view, what has changed is not
the function of adjudication, but rather its forms, occasioned by “the emergence
of a society dominated by the operation of large-scale organizations.”126 Because adjudication involving these organizations simply does not work within
the traditional model—for the reasons outlined above—it becomes necessary to
broaden the focus somewhat to accommodate the greater array of interests
implicated.
3. Interrelated Models of Interrelated Phenomena
A third approach to the relationship between the classic and public law
models would hold that both the models and the phenomena they describe are
interrelated.127 Eisenberg, for example, asserts that “no element of the public
law model is inconsistent with Fuller’s concept of participation.”128 He conceives of Fuller’s model as flexible enough to accommodate the subordination
of the court’s obligation toward strong responsiveness in situations where its
decision will have effects beyond the parties.129 According to this view, while
the traditional forms of adjudication may be expanded or adjusted, they should
not be abandoned. While the parties’ proofs and arguments need not define the
dispute, neither should they be devalued or disregarded. And while the judge in
many cases can no longer remain passive until the moment of decision, she
must remain passive as long as she can and must continually strive to maintain
her neutrality.

125. Fiss, supra note 10, at 35–37.
126. Id. at 36.
127. Such an interrelation could take any number of forms, and I do not purport to offer a
comprehensive catalog here. Meir Dan-Cohen suggests one alternative to those identified in the text:
[T]he two models are, both in theory and in fact, inexorably linked in every institutionalized
mode of adjudication. Far from being descriptive or normative alternatives, the two models
are complementary, representing adjudication as a Janus-faced institution. In conjunction, the
two models reflect a view of the judicial process as ridden with tension.
Dan-Cohen, supra note 51, at 5.
128. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 427.
129. Id. at 427–28; see also EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 3 (“Like a conventional trustee, the judge is
morally bound by his acceptance of office to obey the rules that govern the conduct of his office. Thus
adjudication is driven not (or not only) by the rights of the parties, but by the duty of the judge, which
runs both to the parties and to the larger society.” (citation omitted)).
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A variation on this approach would be to suggest that even if the public law
model does properly counsel the abandonment of some aspects of the traditional
forms of adjudication, it has failed to make the case for the abandonment of all
of them. Indeed, the proponents of the public law model have failed even to try.
Chayes in particular used Fuller’s model as his starting point,130 and both his
and Fiss’s discussions were shaped by their reactions to Fuller.131 And while
Fiss certainly writes as if his intent is to thoroughly discredit and displace
Fuller’s model, much of Fiss’s characterization of the appropriate judicial role
embraced the familiar components of that model.132
4. Commonalities Among the Models
The classic and public law models of adjudication set out core conceptions of
the judicial role that are in many respects fundamentally distinct. In the classic
model, the inquiry is focused on past events and limited to the immediate
parties to the litigation. The public law model, in contrast, looks more toward
the future and considers a broader class of parties and interests. These are
significant differences, and they quite obviously call for distinct means of
fulfilling the judicial role. Yet it is important to bear in mind that the models—
whatever the precise nature of their relationship—have many important commonalities. These commonalities reveal a shared understanding of many of the basic
features of the judicial role, which not only suggests the feasibility of formulating a broadly applicable adjudicative duty, but also provides guideposts for that
undertaking. Adjudication under the public law model still involves an inquiry
into relatively discrete circumstances. Even though the questions may be more
fluid and less tightly focused than in a classic private law dispute, and the
orientation more prospective than retrospective, the undertaking remains quite
constrained when contrasted with a legislative or administrative hearing. And
while the judge can no longer remain passive, she must remain independent and
impartial.133
Perhaps the most important commonality, for purposes of this Article, is party
participation, which remains a critical feature of adjudication under both models. Chayes argued that the participation opportunity afforded to potentially
affected parties is a good in its own right that in turn justifies the judicial role in
public law litigation. This opportunity for participation places the judiciary in
an advantageous position relative to the political branches, where such direct
involvement by potentially affected parties is unlikely to be available.134 In
addition, both Chayes and Fiss emphasized the instrumental value of party

130. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1284.
131. See id.; Fiss, supra note 10, at 41–42.
132. See Molot, supra note 35, at 36 n.18 (“When Chayes and Fiss challenged Fuller’s ideas on
adjudication’s limits, they embraced many—but not all—of Fuller’s ideas on litigation’s forms.”).
133. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1307–08; Fiss, supra note 10, at 14.
134. Chayes, supra note 10, at 1308.
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participation via adversarial proceedings.135 Because the parties want to win,
they operate under an incentive to present their best and most complete case to
the court. While maximizing the significance of party participation may no
longer be a predominant goal of adjudication under the public law model, as is
the case under Fuller’s conception of the classic model, it nonetheless remains a
goal. As a consequence, processes that foster or facilitate party participation
should still be encouraged, particularly if their implementation does not adversely affect more prominent goals. This, in turn, has implications for the
scope of the duty to decide in terms of the extent to which that duty is tied to the
proofs and arguments of the parties.
5. Post-Public Law Models
Although the classic and public law models represent the dominant conceptions of adjudication, they do not individually or in combination capture all of
what transpires in the modern judicial system. Just as Chayes demonstrated that
the classic model could not describe institutional reform litigation, subsequent
commentators have suggested that neither the classic nor public law models
accurately capture certain types of litigation that have become prominent in
recent decades.136 In particular, mass tort and other similar forms of complex
litigation do not fit well into either category. Such cases bear a strong superficial
resemblance to the cases that triggered the development of the public law
model. Indeed, some scholars and judges have suggested or at least acted on the
implicit belief that the public law model provides an appropriate template for
adjudication in this context.137 But the similarities—particularly the “sprawling
and amorphous”138 character of the litigation—belie significant differences,
which range from the typically private nature of the parties and harms to the
largely retrospective orientation of the factual inquiry to the form of the relief
sought, which is typically damages rather than an injunction.139 Although mass
135. Id. at 1308; Fiss, supra note 10, at 29–30.
136. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 372
(2001) (“My premise in this Article is that just as the adversarial model failed to account for what
courts were doing in fact, so too do these newer conceptions [i.e., the public law and managerial
judging models] fail to explain much of what is now happening in complex private litigation.”); David
Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 1015, 1016–18 (2004) (arguing that in practice much of what could be characterized as
lawmaking in institutional reform litigation occurs not through reasoned application of principles
generated by appellate courts but rather through a process of “transjudicial administration” in which
remedies consented to in earlier, similar cases form the basis for remedial agreements in later cases).
137. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 414, 421–24 (1999).
138. Chayes, supra note 10, at 1302; see also Mullenix, supra note 137, at 414 (describing mass tort
litigation as “sprawling [and] complex”).
139. Linda Mullenix identifies seven respects in which the public law model does not fit mass tort
litigation: (1) Mass tort litigation typically involves only private parties and private harms. (2) Mass tort
litigation typically does not involve an attempt to reform a public or quasi-public institution. “Thus,
very little mass tort litigation is directly invested with a public purpose.” Mullenix, supra note 137, at
426. (3) The underlying claims are grounded in local law concerning the rights and duties of private
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tort litigation appears to involve adjudication, in large measure it is characterized by an absence of adjudication. Such cases are almost inevitably channeled
toward settlement, often through processes of negotiation that may be brokered
by the presiding judge, but in a manner that involves comparatively little
adjudication in the relatively narrow sense of this Article. Thus, despite its
adjudicative veneer, the process is better described as “private legislation
implemented through private administrative means but still sanctioned with a
judicial imprimatur”140 or as a “transactional” process that has “more in common with business deals than . . . with traditional adversarial litigation, legislative activity, or executive management.”141
The implications of these developments for the formulation of an adjudicative duty are indirect. Those who have written about the emergence of this new
form of litigation have avoided attempting to provide a normative justification
for the judicial role in the resolution of these lawsuits.142 Indeed, given that one
of the more salient features of this litigation is the relative absence of adjudication, it is not clear that the prescriptive implications of such a theory would be
significant. But the distinctive behavior that these cases lead judges to engage in
may lead to a further weakening of the largely informal constraints that have
traditionally operated to effect judicial compliance with the adjudicative duty.
As Judith Resnick observes, the creation of discovery rights by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure—which required greater judicial involvement in cases
at an earlier stage than was historically the norm—coupled with the variations
in the judicial role required in public law litigation outlined above, led judges to
become more comfortable with (and thus more likely to engage in) behavior

parties, as contrasted with constitutional law claims or claims grounded in other federal law. (4) Mass
tort litigation has been dealt with under a considerably greater range of procedural mechanisms, such
that “just as there is no paradigmatic mass tort litigation, there also is no paradigmatic method for
resolving these cases.” Id. at 428. Public law cases typically involve injunctive class actions or consent
decrees. (5) While public law litigation typically involves similarly situated plaintiffs suffering an
essentially common harm, mass tort plaintiffs involve differently situated plaintiffs with highly
individualized harms. (6) Mass tort litigation typically does not require ongoing postdecision judicial
involvement, because the settlement will typically be administered by the parties. (7) Mass tort
litigation typically involves a suit for damages, while public law cases typically involve claims for
equitable relief. See id. at 426–29. William Rubenstein offers a similar list:
But in several key ways, complex private cases differ significantly from public cases. First,
while the party structure may be complicated by subclasses with differing interests, the parties
in these private cases are easily identifiable as plaintiffs or defendants. Second, liability is
premised upon rather traditional notions of intent, fault, and causation. Thus, unlike in public
law cases, the fact inquiry in complex private cases (when undertaken) tends to be more
historical and conventionally adjudicative than public law cases. Furthermore, relief is thought
to be compensatory. Finally, judicial involvement is not required beyond the entry of judgment, indeed, it is barely required before that.
Rubenstein, supra note 136, at 415.
140. Mullenix, supra note 137, at 431.
141. Rubenstein, supra note 136, at 372.
142. See Mullenix, supra note 137, at 424; Rubenstein, supra note 136, at 438.
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that is more proactive than called for under the classic model.143 In similar
fashion, the entirely new dimensions of the judicial role utilized to shepherd
mass tort cases toward resolution might lead judges to stray still farther. To the
extent any of this “mission creep” might affect the judicial tendency to adhere
to the adjudicative duty, the emergence of yet another form of litigation only
underscores the need to clarify precisely what it is that we expect of judges in
deciding cases and claims.
D. JUDICIAL CANDOR

For the most part, the models of adjudication discussed above do not engage
the relationship between the processes of decision they describe or advocate and
the manner in which those decisions are justified by the courts charged with
making them. This is a significant omission. Without a public statement of the
reasons for a court’s decision, it is difficult for the public to assess whether that
decision was reached in proper fashion, including whether it was in accordance
with an adjudicative duty. What is more, it might be the case that justification
serves not merely the purpose of facilitating public monitoring, but instead
constitutes an important part of the decisional process itself. In either case, it is
critical to the task of defining the adjudicative duty to go beyond the question of
whether a court must elaborate on the reasons for its decision to consider the
appropriate depth and extent of that elaboration.
Central to this inquiry is the topic of judicial candor, which concerns the
extent to which judicial opinions can and should fully and accurately set forth
the reasons for a court’s decision.144 An obligation of candor has obvious
intuitive appeal, and the intellectual justifications for such a duty likewise
spring readily to mind.145 On a moral plane, judicial failures to be completely

143. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); see also Todd
D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 41, 112 (1995) (arguing that the tools of managerial judging “effectively evade the
checks on judicial power that the framers created”).
144. As Judge Guido Calabresi observes, the topic of candor is vast and underlies a great many
significant legal debates. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172 (1982). Thus
it makes frequent, though often largely implicit, appearances through a broad range of legal scholarship. There is, however, a small body of scholarship focusing directly on the issue. See generally Scott
Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of
Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L.
REV. 721 (1979); David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 509 (2001); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731
(1987) [hereinafter D. Shapiro]; Shapiro, supra note 32; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and
Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989).
145. Scott Idleman catalogues nine potential justifications for a candor requirement: (1) to enhance
accountability; (2) to provide a limitation on judicial power; (3) to create incentives for greater care in
decisionmaking and thereby engender greater quality of decision; (4) to enhance authoritativeness; (5)
to fulfill an obligation to justify a court’s decision to the parties before it; (6) to provide guidance to
those who need to structure their affairs in accordance with legal norms; (7) to provide a means of
judicial catharsis; (8) to foster the long-term development of the law; and (9) to fulfill moral obligation.
See Idleman, supra note 144, at 1335–73.
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forthcoming strike us as inappropriate simply because such behavior is dishonest. We regard lying as bad in the abstract and perhaps particularly troubling
when engaged in by the arm of government charged with pronouncing and
applying the law impartially.146 There are instrumental justifications as well.
Courts—especially appellate courts—operate largely outside the public eye.
Because nearly all of the decisional process is hidden from view, the judiciary’s
legitimacy and authority depend largely on its ability to persuasively explain
and justify its decisions.147 The process of explanation and justification, of
course, occurs largely through the issuance of written opinions, which provide
the almost exclusive basis for holding judges accountable and assessing their
performance in general.148 Only when the reasons provided by a court are those
that actually motivated its decision can the public properly debate the appropriateness of the decision, legislatures react to it, and private actors structure their
affairs to comply with it. If the court’s true reasons remain hidden, subsequent
litigants may find that their case is not resolved according to the criteria
apparently relied on in the prior case but instead according to some hidden
rule.149 For similar reasons, an effective candor requirement would operate to
discipline judges. Judges who must disclose the actual reasons for their decisions are more likely to work to confine their decisional process to the consideration of acceptable criteria,150 including those relied upon by past courts.151

146. See D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 736–37 (“The case for honesty in all human relations, I
believe, rests in part on the importance of treating others with respect: lack of candor often carries with
it the implication that the listener is less capable of dealing with the truth, and thus less worth of
respect, than the speaker.”); Zeppos, supra note 144, at 401–02 (“[T]he unspoken premise for almost all
of the prior calls for candor, is that deception in judging undermines the integrity of the judiciary. The
almost universal condemnation of lying suggests that those who call for judicial candor have staked out
the moral high ground.” (citations omitted)).
147. See D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 737 (“A requirement that judges give reasons for their
decisions—grounds of decision that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in
constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995) (“One of the few ways we
have to justify our power to decide matters important to our fellow citizens is to explain why we decide
as we do.”).
148. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 4 (1941) (observing that written
judicial opinions “serve[] as a check upon the judiciary under our system of checks and balances in a
polity in which so many legal questions are political and so many political questions are legal”).
149. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 147 (“Prolixity and lack of candor are not mere inelegances in
judicial opinions. They increase the time required for reading an opinion . . . [a]nd they reduce the
opinion’s usefulness as a guide to what the judges are likely to do in future cases.”).
150. Candid judges are more likely to act based on the reasons they or their predecessors have
provided for action in the past, because the very idea of precedent means those reasons constitute
acceptable criteria for acting. This is, I realize, a loose conception of precedent. While I concede that
the question of whether the system of precedent ought to be so conceived is open to debate, see John B.
Borger & Chad M. Oldfather, Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions,
36 TORT & INS. L.J. 899, 908–10 (2001), I stand by Llewellyn in maintaining that all the reasons
provided by a prior court are at least potentially precedential in a later case if the later court elects to
use them in that way. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66–67
(3d ed. 1960).
In turn, this means that consumers of judicial opinions will be better able to predict what the court
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The mechanism breaks down if the reasons provided by a court do not track
the actual reasons for its decisions. The breakdown could happen in two ways.
Most dramatically, the justifications provided for a single decision could be so
self-evidently inappropriate or inadequate as to call into question, in dramatic
fashion, the court’s credibility as a neutral and competent interpreter of the
law.152 More likely, the gradual accumulation of apparent differences between
the way a court resolves cases and the reasons it offers in support of those
resolutions could lead it to be discredited over time. In either case, a court that
is not candid will come to be viewed as a court that is not credible.153 A court
that is not regarded as credible, in turn, runs a considerable risk of becoming a
court that is not regarded as legitimate.154
For these reasons, the generally accepted yet rarely articulated position is that
courts should strive to be universally candid.155 Indeed, perhaps the most
common critique found in legal scholarship is that the court whose work is
under consideration has failed to be appropriately forthcoming about what it
aims to accomplish.156 Yet, despite the intuitive appeal of candor in judging,
even a moment’s reflection reveals that, whatever its desirability as a matter of
theory, full candor is unattainable in practice. A judge can no better explain all
the reasons behind a decision than I can fully explain why I have chosen to
write this sentence using these words in this order.157 Within broad parameters

will do with the next case to come before it. Predictability is the most commonly offered, if not the
most fundamental, justification for the system of precedent. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 571, 597 (1987).
151. The magnitude, if not the existence, of these effects on predictability has been questioned. If
one effect of more candid decisionmaking would be to enlarge the category of permissible bases for
decision, this effect would potentially decrease predictability for the same reasons that standards are
generally less predictable in application than rules. See Zeppos, supra note 144, at 402–03.
152. Justice Stevens suggested this was the case with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.
See 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although we may never know with complete
certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is
perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”).
153. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 148–49.
154. “It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true
backbone of the rule of law.” Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. See Idleman, supra note 144, at 1309 (“The conventional wisdom, to be sure, is apparently that
candor is an ideal toward which judges should almost always aspire and that any exceptions to this rule
are few and far between.”).
156. See D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 731 (“A typical law review note, or even a leading article,
will address an important judicial decision, or series of decisions, in an effort to show that the court has
misconceived the problem, the solution, or both. Implicit in the analysis is a hint that whoever wrote the
opinion was too inept, or perhaps too devious, to reveal what was really at stake.”).
157. See Frank, supra note 32, at 653–55 (characterizing judicial opinions as post hoc justifications
of decisions based on hunches resulting from “[t]he effect of innumerable stimuli on what is loosely
termed ‘the personality of the judge’”); Leflar, supra note 144, at 723 (“The failure of judicial opinions
to set out the real reasons for a court’s decision is seldom deliberate coverup. A good result (or a bad
one) may be based more on judicial intuition, on a judge’s sense of what fits in with his standards and
ideals, than on thorough analysis.”). Dan Simon suggests that “the making of a good decision is
convoluted in that it entails an extensive series of constructing and testing of a large number of
combinations of legal arguments. Even if a full report of this process were possible, it would be

158

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94:121

such explanation is possible, but in its particulars the decision to take one of a
multitude of available paths to roughly the same location defies explanation.
What is more, even if I could formulate reasons for my choice of words, the list
would likely be too long and complex to justify the endeavor. The problem
remains even if the obligation to be candid does not extend to such an extreme.
As Nicholas Zeppos puts it:
[T]he complexity of the [judging] process may also belie the notion that the
judge can separate out the “false” reasons for a decision . . . from the “real”
reasons . . . . As much as any other product of human decisionmaking, the
judge’s work is subject to the complex ways in which the human mind orders,
explains, and processes information.158

As the discussion suggests, a candor obligation has two potential dimensions.
The first is that of subjective candor. A judge fails to be candid in this sense
when she consciously provides false or misleading justifications for her conclusions159 or, perhaps, when she is indifferent to whether her justifications will
mislead.160 The primary focus is on the judge’s state of mind. The second
dimension is that of objective candor. Under an objective definition, a candor
obligation might extend to include not only judicial self-deception, but any
failure to measure up “to one or more external criteria of assessment such as
truth, logical validity, or factual or empirical accuracy.”161 Here, a judge might
be charged with a failure to be candid that arises entirely from his ignorance of,
say, the falsity of one of the grounds on which he has justified a decision, even
if he has acted entirely in good faith.162 Thus objective failures of candor
include the judge’s “ignorance or incompetence.”163
Having noted the dual dimensions of a candor obligation, commentators
typically proceed to focus their analyses on the subjective component.164 To a
large degree, this is because subjective failures are what most observers find
troubling.165 In addition, there are the perceived difficulties involved in policing
and remedying violations of an objective candor requirement: not only determin-

unmanageably lengthy, very confusing, and thus quite useless.” Simon, supra note 32, at 35 (citation
omitted).
158. Zeppos, supra note 144, at 407.
159. See Idleman, supra note 144, at 1317–18. There are, not surprisingly, subtle variances in the
way different commentators define and distinguish these concepts. Altman, for example, uses the
concepts of candor and introspection to capture a roughly similar distinction. See Altman, supra note
144, at 297 (“Perhaps judges should be candid but not introspective. By candid, I mean never being
consciously duplicitous. Candid opinions do not offer reasons judges know do not persuade them. By
introspective, I mean critically examining one’s mental states to avoid any self-deception or error.”).
160. See D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 733.
161. Idleman, supra note 144, at 1317.
162. Id. at 1317–18.
163. Id. at 1318.
164. Id. at 1316–21.
165. Id. at 1318.
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ing what judges do not know, but getting them to recognize that they lack the
relevant knowledge.166 Even for those judges willing to seek the greater selfawareness necessary to reduce violations of an objective candor requirement,
the payoff may not be worth the considerable effort necessary.167 What is more,
some have suggested that the result of greater judicial self-awareness might be,
from a systemic perspective, undesirable. Scott Altman argues that if judges
were to hold accurate beliefs about the validity of theories of neutral decisionmaking, the result would be that they would feel less constrained in their decisionmaking.168 That is, he contends that even though legal standards do not provide the
level of constraint on their decisions that most judges believe they do, the mere
fact that most judges hold such a belief renders them more constrained than they
would feel if greater self-awareness led them to appropriate conclusions about
the lack of constraint effected by law.169
Nor does subjective candor warrant a universal obligation. Even David
Shapiro, who characterizes candor as “the sine qua non of all other restraints on
abuse of judicial power,”170 concedes that candor is not “an unshakable rule of
judicial behavior.”171 Commentators have identified a number of situations in
which complete candor might not be desirable.172 While each of these examples
is contestable, both in terms of its basic validity and its scope, the key point is
that no one who has focused on the issue of judicial candor has failed to
conclude that there are at least some occasions on which a lack of candor may
be excused. Thus, to focus on a few examples, sometimes the use of absolute
language to describe a legal doctrine or justification may be appropriate even if
not completely accurate, simply because it functions to neutralize potential
slippery-slope problems. Calabresi uses the example of state regulation of
religion:
If we admit that the state can regulate religion, we are psychologically, if not
logically, more likely to allow such regulation than if we say that there can be
no regulation of religion and then from time to time define behavior by some
cults as not religious and hence subject to regulation.173

166. Id. at 1319.
167. See Zeppos, supra note 144, at 411.
168. See Altman, supra note 144, at 298–99.
169. See id. at 304.
170. D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 737.
171. Id. at 738.
172. The exceptions discussed here do not constitute a comprehensive list of those identified in the
commentary. For additional exceptions, see Idleman, supra note 144, at 1382–88; D. Shapiro, supra
note 144, at 739–50.
173. CALABRESI, supra note 144, at 173. Prohibitions on the torture of criminal suspects present
another example:
This family of behaviors is difficult to regulate. It consists of acts we want committed so
rarely, if ever, that we dare not endorse them explicitly under any circumstances; yet, we may
quietly hope that a breach of the norms against them will occur if the benefits are extraordinary and the costs containable.
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Or a case may present a conflict between fundamental values, in which instance
full candor would require a court to acknowledge that it is sacrificing one of
those values for the sake of the other. If recognition of this sacrifice “would be too
destructive for the particular society to accept,”174 then something less than
complete candor would be acceptable, according to Calabresi, simply because we
place a lesser premium on candor as compared to the other values at stake in the
case.175 There may also be institutional or jurisprudential reasons for a lack of
complete candor, including for example the need for judges on multiple-member
courts to accommodate the views of their colleagues176 and the need to work within
the system of precedent.177 Indeed, Martin Shapiro has argued that the very nature of
our system of precedent makes deceit a central feature of the act of judging. As
he put it, courts “must always deny their authority to make law, even when they
are making law. One may call this justificatory history, but I call it lying. Court
and judges always lie. Lying is the nature of the judicial activity.”178
My intent is not to offer another perspective on the relative flexibility of the
candor obligation. Instead, it is to note for present purposes that candor is a
highly desirable even if not unconditional feature of legitimate adjudication. As
David Shapiro points out, “even arguments for occasional deception depend for
their effectiveness on a background of truthfulness, for the deception loses its
point if it is not believed.”179 It is also appropriate to note that the considerations making candor desirable likewise suggest that courts generally ought to
provide a public statement of reasons for their decisions. It is the unification of
this strand of theory with that embodied in the literature on models of adjudication that is most significant for purposes of formulating a duty to decide.
III. TRACING THE CONTOURS OF THE ADJUDICATIVE DUTY
A. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The goals of this Part are to draw on adjudicative theory to bring the
questions raised in Part I into sharper focus and to trace the contours of the
adjudicative duty as precisely as possible. This turns out to be a slippery
undertaking. Consequently, some further definition is appropriate.

Ward Farnsworth, “To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong”: A User’s Guide to Judicial Lawlessness,
86 MINN. L. REV. 227, 236–37 (2001). Even if one accepts this as an appropriate basis for departing
from the norm of candor, its use must be reserved for exceptional circumstances. As Cardozo warned,
“[g]reat maxims, if they be violated with impunity, are honored often with lip-service, which passes
easily into irreverence.” BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 93–94 (1921).
174. CALABRESI, supra note 144, at 172.
175. Id. at 172–73.
176. See Idleman, supra note 144, at 1384–85; D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 742–43. Indeed, in
such circumstances there is a sense that notions such as candor and sincerity are inapplicable. See John
Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 487–88 (2001).
177. See Idleman, supra note 144, at 1382–83; D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 739.
178. Shapiro, supra note 32, at 156.
179. D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 737.
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1. Cases and Claims
The first distinction I want to make is between a “case” and “claims.” By
“case” I mean the lawsuit between the parties at a broad level, without regard to
its legal subcomponents. Thus resolution of a case might require only a determination that the defendant in a tort suit must compensate the plaintiff. By
“claims” I mean any claim, issue, or argument that, if considered by the court
and resolved in a particular way, would have a material effect on the disposition
of the case. In a tort suit, claims would include not merely the plaintiff’s
asserted theories of liability—negligence, strict liability, and so on—but could
also extend to arguments about the admissibility of expert testimony, the
applicability of evidentiary privileges, and the like. Note that this is an inherently fluid definition. The defendant might, for example, challenge liability as a
matter of law, dispute the admissibility of plaintiff’s expert testimony, and assert
that plaintiff’s contributory negligence bars recovery. If the court agrees with
the argument that plaintiff has failed to state a claim as a matter of law, then the
remaining arguments are no longer “claims” for present purposes, simply
because their resolution can have no effect on the ultimate disposition of the
case.
2. Duties and Preferences
I also want to draw a rough distinction between a “duty” and a “preference.” I
will use the word duty in its sense as a correlative of a right.180 Thus a court is
under a duty to do that which the parties have a right to expect of it, just as
everyone has the right to expect others to act with reasonable care. In this sense,
a duty is a requirement with no, or at least very few, exceptions. I will use the
word preference, in contrast, to refer to the relative strength of an obligation to
do things that are desirable in the abstract, but that are not categorically
required. Under this usage, a preference may be foregone when it conflicts with
a duty, a stronger preference, or perhaps even prudential concerns that render
compliance with the preference inappropriate under the circumstances.
3. Scope, Responsiveness, and Elaboration
The core question this Article seeks to address concerns whether and to what
extent a court presented with a case involving otherwise justiciable claims
operates under a duty to adjudicate that case and the claims presented therein.
To this point, those questions have remained somewhat imprecise. If there is a
duty to adjudicate (or even a mere preference for adjudication), a host of
subsidiary questions follow. What do we mean by “adjudication”? What, in

180. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 453 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “duty” as “the correlative of right”
and noting that “wherever there exists a right in any person, there also rests a corresponding duty upon
some other person or upon all persons generally”); WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 36–38 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (conceiving of
“rights” and “duties” as correlatives).
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other words, are the permissible ways for a court to resolve the claims put
before it? Are some of those ways preferable to others? Can a court simply
declare a winner, or must it provide some explanation for the result it reached?
Must it select from the grounds for resolution offered by the parties, or is it free
to base its decision on different grounds? These questions lead to still other
questions, threatening to imperil the project in a definitional muddle before it
gets underway. What is more, the answers to many of these questions may
depend on the nature of the claim involved, as well as the court to which that
claim is presented. We might, for example, expect courts to deal with factintensive questions differently than pure questions of law. And not only are the
questions before trial courts often quite distinct from those presented to courts
of last resort, so too are the functions of those respective courts distinct. As a
consequence, even when presented with the same claim in the same case, we
might want a district court judge (whose focus ought to be more on dispute
resolution) to adjudicate in a different manner than a justice of a supreme court
(who must place more emphasis on the formulation of an appropriate legal
norm).181
Some simplification is clearly in order. The discussion in Parts I and II was
largely indifferent to the distinctions just mentioned, in part because most
models of adjudication tend to recognize such distinctions only implicitly, if at
all. Part III, however, will focus on claims arising before intermediate appellate
courts, which present the questions in the cleanest fashion.182 Such courts do
not typically enjoy the express ability to refuse to consider the justiciable cases
brought before them.183 In addition, the claims asserted in those cases are
characteristically discrete and well defined. As a result, it is realistic to assume
that an adjudicative duty, whatever its content might be, applies to such courts.
It is also possible, because the appeals process requires the parties to isolate and
identify the bases on which they seek relief, to specify the claims at issue and
assess the court’s obligations with respect to them. I do not mean to suggest that
the analysis that follows cannot be extended beyond this context, though I do

181. See Solum, supra note 33, at 241–42 (recognizing the need to be mindful of such distinctions in
the design and implementation of procedural theories); cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives
and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 470–71 (1998) (observing that factors of institutional
design and individual incentives may combine to result in different decisions at the trial and appellate
levels).
182. A focus on appellate courts does introduce one potential complication, namely that the right to
appeal can itself be called into question. See, e.g., Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal
(More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62 (1985). But given that we routinely impose constraints and
grant rights within the context of appeals even without an underlying right, it seems appropriate to
conclude that we would want to impose the adjudicative duty in the context of such appeals as we
choose to allow.
183. Some have suggested that, at least with respect to the federal courts of appeal, this lack of
discretion is more theoretical than real. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism,
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
273, 275 (1996) (arguing that, despite an apparent statutory obligation to the contrary, “the circuit
courts have become certiorari courts”).
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mean to suggest that context is more important than prior analyses have
generally recognized. All of what follows can be applied to the trial context, but
because the functions of trial courts differ from those of appellate courts, the
implications of the analysis will necessarily differ. The discussion adverts to
some of these possible differences, but it does not purport to be comprehensive.
Consider an appeal in which the appellant raises three typical claims: (1) the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict against him, (2) certain evidence was erroneously admitted or excluded, and (3) the jury was improperly
instructed on some point of law. The appellant presumably believes that a ruling
in his favor on any of these claims entitles it to relief. Thus the common
understanding is that the court’s responsibility is to contend with these issues in
such a way that at the end of its decisional process it has resolved all the claims,
either ending the case or remanding to the trial court for further proceedings.
The court might, for example, reject all of the appellant’s claims, in which case
the litigation would end. Or it might agree with the appellant that the evidence
was insufficient to support the verdict, in which instance it would only be
necessary to address the second and third issues if the remedy were a remand
for a new trial. Almost certainly the court will justify its decision by issuing an
opinion, which will specify the appellant’s claims, identify the pertinent authority, analyze the claims in light of that authority, and set forth the court’s
conclusions regarding the validity of those claims.
But the fact that appellate courts take such actions in most of the cases that
come before them does not mean, of course, that the courts are obligated to do
so. Indeed, one can imagine an entire range of obligations that might be
characterized as falling within a duty to adjudicate, varying according to the
answers to the questions posed at the outset of this discussion. And the use of
the “range” metaphor, which implies a unidimensional continuum of potential
obligations, may be somewhat misleading, given the multiple, often conflicting
values, norms, and ends that adjudication is designed to serve.184 In recognition
of this, the remainder of Part III.A identifies several dimensions of a potential
adjudicative duty, which can themselves be classified as questions of scope,
questions of responsiveness, and questions of elaboration. These are not independent questions. As the analysis will reveal, there is a considerable degree of
interrelation among them. It is useful nonetheless to focus on each separately,
because each implicates a distinct set of concerns.
In terms of decisional scope, two options exist, in addition to the possibility
that courts operate under no duty at all. These options correspond to the
distinction between cases and claims drawn above. Thus, at its most fundamental, an adjudicative duty might require only that a court resolve the case. A court
would satisfy such a duty simply by selecting a winner in the case before it.
Since at this point we are only concerned with scope, no particular methodology
of decision is implied. Alternatively, an adjudicative duty might extend to
184. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51.
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include resolution of the claims presented. Again, the manner in which that
decision is reached presents a separate question.
Responsiveness refers to the degree to which the decision is based on and
proceeds from the arguments and information presented to the court by the
parties.185 Three possibilities arise. A requirement of strong responsiveness
would bind the court as closely as possible to the content and contours of the
parties’ arguments. The complete lack of a responsiveness requirement, which I
will call nonresponsiveness, would not obligate the court to confine its analysis
to the parties’ arguments or even to consider them at all. A third possibility is
weak responsiveness, which would require the court to consider and respond to
the parties’ arguments, but not to confine the raw materials of its decisional
process to those arguments.
Elaboration concerns the extent to which, and candor with which, the court
provides reasons for its decision. The obvious endpoints of the measure are full
elaboration, pursuant to which the court would be obligated to state as fully as
possible the reasons behind its decision, and no elaboration, pursuant to which
only the announcement of a result would be required. Here, too, a middle range
exists, although the range of alternatives is perhaps easier to appreciate conceptually than define precisely.186 The forms of elaboration can vary, as well: from
oral, off-the-record statements to a written, published opinion. Candor refers to
the extent to which the reasons the court provides are the “real” reasons for its
decision, rather than a subterfuge.187 There are also stopping points between a
full candor obligation and no candor obligation, although once again precise
definition of any such point is a task not worth the effort for present purposes.
B. TRACING THE CONTOURS OF THE ADJUDICATIVE DUTY

Having developed a framework for analysis, Part III.B returns to the conceptions of the adjudicative process discussed in Part II. The analysis addresses
questions of scope, responsiveness, and elaboration in turn, with the goal of
exploring the models’ implications for each dimension of the adjudicative duty.
As suggested in Part II.C.4, the analysis reveals that the classic and public law
conceptions of adjudication are largely consistent with respect to each dimen-

185. I borrow the concept of responsiveness from Melvin Eisenberg, who uses it to characterize
Fuller’s model as calling for strong responsiveness. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 411–14.
186. Here is Judge Coffin’s attempt at delimiting points along a similar spectrum (which he calls
“formality”):
In the continuum of increasing formality, decisions may be ranked as follows: a one-sentence
or several-sentence order affirming under a rule or a cited authority; a sentence indicating
adoption of the opinion of the trial court, sometimes with a few added comments; a per
curiam opinion (i.e., unsigned, without indication of individual authorship) of a paragraph or
two, usually unpublished; a full opinion, but so fact-bound and lacking in precedent that it is
not to be published and is often unsigned; a full opinion, signed, and to be published.
FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 165 (1994).
187. See supra Part II.D.
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sion. Specifically, I argue that intermediate appellate courts have a duty to
adjudicate the claims raised by the parties in a weakly responsive fashion,
coupled with a preference for strong responsiveness and full, candid elaboration. Although I advocate a specific position, it is perhaps more important to
recognize that while the normative implications of the theories considered for
the content of an adjudicative duty are not consistent in all their particulars, the
general implications of theory turn out to be both broadly consistent and
compatible.
1. Scope
As has been frequently noted, the dispute resolution function of courts at its
most fundamental requires only that courts decide at the level of the case.188
Both the classic and public law models clearly rely on this assumption; neither
model allows the courts to decline to select a winner.189 The more interesting
question concerns whether courts must also decide the claims presented. Resolution at the level of the case does not necessarily decide the dispute as the parties
conceive it. A court that declares a winner following the flip of a coin could
bring a lawsuit to a final conclusion by doing so, and if that method of decision
were to be sanctioned by law, it could preclude the parties from ever raising the
matter again. Remaining unresolved, however, would be the precise disagreement between the parties. In other words, Party A might know that Party B was
ordered to pay damages, but it would not have an authoritative answer to its
claim that Party B breached the contract between them. This might not prove to
be enough. Finality is a necessary but not sufficient condition to the legitimacy
of adjudication.190 Thus any adjudicative system that values party participation
must require courts to confront the claims and not merely the case. This is so for
the reasons articulated by Fuller, and it is inherent in the argument for strong
responsiveness. If courts are not required to attend to the proofs and arguments
of the parties and otherwise engage the dispute at the level of the claims
asserted, the decisional process is likely in at least some instances to become so
untethered to the parties’ participation as to render it meaningless. This circumstance, for Fuller, would render the entire process “a sham.”191 But note as well
that a requirement that adjudication take place at the level of claims does not

188. See supra text accompanying notes 58–59.
189. Fuller and Eisenberg can be taken to have assumed a duty to decide at the level of the case
because, as the remainder of this section demonstrates, their analyses also call for the imposition of a
claim. Both Chayes and Fiss expressly articulate the assumption in the context of discussing the
institutional characteristics of courts. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1308 (“Unlike an administrative
bureaucracy or a legislature, the judiciary must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved.”); Fiss,
supra note 10, at 13 (“Judges are not in control of their agenda, but are compelled to confront
grievances or claims they would otherwise prefer to ignore.”).
190. “This finality of adjudication, indeed, is one of its prime attractions as a method of social
control. It is a means of disposing of controversies definitively—providing, of course, that the
disposition proves to be acceptable enough to be dispository.” HART & SACKS, supra note 16, at 642.
191. Fuller, supra note 9, at 388.
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obligate the court to accept the parties’ characterization of their dispute. Strong
responsiveness implies a duty to adjudicate claims, but the implication does not
run in the other direction.
A view of adjudication as representation likewise requires an adjudicative
duty that extends to claims, because without such an obligation judicial lawmaking would be shorn of its democratic characteristics and thus less legitimate.192
In this sense, it stands contrary to most views of adjudication that elevate the
lawmaking function over the dispute resolution function.193 Under the traditional conception of the lawmaking function, responsiveness to the parties’
characterization of their dispute is at best incidental to the fulfillment of the
broader goal of formulating appropriate legal standards. According to this view,
the lawmaking function, standing alone, would be best served if there were no
adjudicative duty at all, in which case questions of scope would be a nonissue.
Some cases simply do not present the “right” set of facts upon which to base
legal standards that will be binding in future cases, and consequently a court
created solely or primarily for the creation of law would be well advised to
refuse to decide those cases if it could. Such courts exist, of course, in the form
of nearly all the supreme courts in the United States.194 But even those supreme
courts generally limit themselves to resolution of the claims presented by the
parties.195 This self-limitation can be seen as a manifestation of the logic
underlying the design of the judicial mechanism, which recognizes the value of
engaging with specific disputes. After all, specific disputes define the type of
reasoning and decisionmaking a court may partake in.196 By extension, it is
appropriate for courts to engage with the specific claims presented, since those
claims represent the parties’ conceptualization of the specific dispute they bring
to the court and thus stand as strong evidence of the legally significant facts that
ought to anchor the court’s reasoning. Of course, courts further down the
judicial hierarchy have either express or implied dispute resolution responsibilities, which provide independent justification for a claims-centered duty.
This analysis holds even under the public law model. Because a court
operating under that model is charged with a proactive role and has a responsibility to factor a broad set of interests into its decision, it may be appropriate for
192. See supra Part II.A.2.
193. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
194. In three-tiered judicial systems, “the supreme court is concerned primarily with the development of the law, while the intermediate court is concerned primarily with the application of existing
law.” DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 26
(1994).
195. It is noteworthy when they do not. See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., Sua Sponte Consideration on
Appeal, 9 TRIAL JUDGES’ J. 68 (1970) (discussing the “notable” instances in which high courts have
departed from this paradigm).
196. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 24, at 319 (“Judges are disciplined by the specificity of the
cases they must decide, and this discipline not only puts a limit on the speculative theorizing in which
they may engage, but is also bound to remind them, as they go about their work, of the value of
deliberative wisdom—the wisdom that consists in a knowledge of particulars and that no general theory
can provide.”).
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the court to conclude that the parties have raised the wrong claims and to base
its decision on a distinct set of concerns. This would not, however, be inconsistent with an obligation to decide the parties’ claims, at least insofar as rejecting
those claims in favor of the court’s characterization of the dispute constitutes an
appropriate form of deciding the claims (as I argue below). Moreover, from a
systemic perspective, there is a lawmaking benefit to requiring the court to
engage with the parties’ claims in the sense of attending to the proofs and
arguments that compose those claims—even if it ultimately rejects them—
rather than resolving the case in free-form fashion without giving meaningful
consideration to the parties’ input. This benefit stems both from the benefit of
having courts engage with specific disputes197 and from the fact that doing so
provides some information about what the law is not—and, as a result, what the
law is. These arguments are even stronger in the appellate context. Because
appellate courts are extremely limited in their capacity to gather nonlegal
information about a case other than that presented by the parties,198 and in any
event are generally restricted to basing their decision on the record created
before the trial court,199 there is more reason to suggest that appellate courts
should decide the claims presented.200 Not only are such courts comparatively
ill-suited to expand the representational framework, but the trial court will
presumably already have done so if appropriate. Thus the difference between an
appeal under the public law versus classic model will be considerably less than
that between the same cases at the trial level.201
It bears emphasis that the present discussion is concerned only with the scope
of adjudication, not with the means or products of the process. While it may not
be possible to completely separate these features, it is appropriate to suggest
that we want courts to engage with the claims as they are characterized by the
parties regardless of how the courts ultimately use those characterizations, if at
all. The more information a court takes into account in its process of making
law, the better the law is likely to be. In sum, true fulfillment of the dispute
resolution function requires that the scope of the adjudicative duty extend to the
claims presented. A duty of such scope is necessary to ensure meaningful party
participation. While such a duty might be inconsistent with some views of a
197. Id.
198. For a general discussion of the factfinding capabilities of appellate courts, see Chad M.
Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437
(2004).
199. See ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 175 (2d ed. 1989).
200. This is not to suggest that there is no difference at the appellate stage between traditional cases
and public law cases. See, e.g., CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 6 (“A growing breed of appeals is
not of the classic, bipolar mold, with A suing B for damages, divorce, or disseisin, but is polycentric,
affecting rights of large groups of people, with many possible outcomes, and requiring assimilation of
complex data.”).
201. I do not mean to imply that a claims-centered duty does not apply at the trial court level, only
that the arguments are even stronger at the appellate level, which is my focus here. The specifics of the
adjudicative duty may be different at different levels of the judicial hierarchy. See supra Part III.A.3.
However, this is not one of the areas of difference.
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pure lawmaking body, it is perfectly consistent with, and may even enhance the
operation of, a court that must fulfill both the lawmaking and dispute resolution
functions.
2. Responsiveness
There are two realistic options for the responsiveness component of an
adjudicative duty.202 Strong responsiveness would confine a court as closely as
possible to the proofs and arguments of the parties. A strongly responsive court
would maintain a wholly reactive posture, addressing disputes on the terms
suggested by the parties and resolving them only by resort to the materials
offered by the parties to support their positions. Weak responsiveness, in
contrast, would obligate the court to attend to the parties’ proofs and arguments—to gain an understanding of them and to bear them in mind during the
decisional process—but would not preclude the consideration of other information. A weakly responsive court could thus decide a case on grounds of its own
formulation, and its obligation to the parties would be satisfied by giving due
consideration to the parties’ arguments and reaching a reasoned conclusion that
those arguments do not provide an appropriate basis for resolution.
Of course, these are not distinct categories in the sense that a decision is
either one or the other (or neither). A decision could be based partially on
considerations offered by the parties, thus exceeding the requirements of weak
responsiveness while not qualifying as strongly responsive. The point is to
determine whether one or the other ought to serve as a minimum component of
adjudication. As the remainder of this Part argues, the practical and theoretical
underpinnings of the adjudicative process support the imposition of a duty to be
weakly responsive, but only a preference for strong responsiveness.
a. The Case Against a Duty of Strong Responsiveness. On initial consideration, strong responsiveness seems essential to fulfillment of the dispute
resolution function, for the same reasons that dispute resolution requires a duty
that extends to the claims presented.203 Only if a court bases its decision on
the parties’ proofs and arguments can the court truly be characterized as
resolving the parties’ dispute in a legitimate fashion.204 But further consideration reveals cracks in this analysis. The parties might simply misconceive the
nature of their dispute. A tort claim does not become a contract claim simply
because the parties have decided to discuss it as if it were, and it would make no
sense for a court to attempt to resolve the claim using what it has concluded is
the wrong law. Less dramatically, but more likely, is a dispute in which, as
Anthony Kronman puts it, “the claims which compete for judicial endorsement
202. Earlier I identified nonresponsiveness as a possible third option. See supra text accompanying
note 185. Because nonresponsiveness would place no obligations on a court, it is inconsistent with the
imposition of a duty, and thus not discussed in this section.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 188–190.
204. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 413.
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cannot . . . be commensurated without recharacterizing them in a way that alters
their essential meaning for the parties involved.”205 If the parties’ arguments
cannot be assessed under a common unit of comparison, the court must necessarily adopt one frame of reference and thereby leave at least one of the parties
with the feeling that the decision is not strongly responsive. Indeed, as Fuller
recognized, even when the court and the parties are on the same conceptual
page, it is inevitable that their understandings of the case will not be fully
coextensive.206 These instances may be relatively rare, but they surely exist.
Thus even dispute resolution can support only a preference for strong responsiveness.
The same holds true with respect to the lawmaking function. As Eisenberg
recognizes, strong responsiveness stands in tension with any view of the
lawmaking function that calls upon courts to generate rules to govern similar
disputes in the future.207 The public law model forsakes strong responsiveness
for similar reasons. This is so whether the model is viewed to advocate
elevating the lawmaking function or public values over dispute resolution, or
simply taken to stand for the need to take a broader array of interests into
account in certain types of disputes. Whatever the governing standard, there
remains the possibility of gaps between the parties’ interests and the universe of
interests potentially affected by the lawsuit’s resolution. This possibility requires a shift in emphasis: from strong responsiveness to the parties’ precise
claims to generation of legal standards that are responsive to this broader
community of needs.208
Of course, perhaps the most significant aspect of adjudication as representation for present purposes is that it provides an account of the lawmaking
function that calls for strong responsiveness. Peters recognizes the tensions just
discussed, but counsels in favor of judicial minimalism as the appropriate
solution. Thus courts should reach issues only when necessary to resolve the
case and should tailor their decisions as closely to the facts of the case as
possible.209 Only by operating in this fashion, Peters argues, can courts maintain
the connection between the litigants’ proofs and arguments and the resulting
decisions. Without this connection, litigants cannot serve as interest representatives for those who will be bound by the decisions in the future.
But minimalism only partially addresses the critiques offered by public law
theory. A court could avoid unnecessarily affecting the rights and interests of
nonparties by tailoring its decision as narrowly as possible to the precise dispute
before it,210 but the public law model suggests that often such a disposition

205. KRONMAN, supra note 24, at 340.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 76–78.
208. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 427–28 (discussing the relationship between the Fuller and
public law models of adjudication).
209. See Peters, supra note 31, at 417.
210. See supra text accompanying note 209.
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would be impractical if not impossible. If, for example, resolution of the lawsuit
requires a court to adjudicate the appropriateness of the acts of some government institution, such as a school district or prison system, it will necessarily
affect those who must deal with that institution even if they are not parties to the
case. The way out of this dilemma, I argue in the next section, is not reliance on
minimalism, but weak responsiveness.
Strong responsiveness also stands in tension with a candor obligation, in that
a court consciously working toward strong responsiveness faces incentives to
avoid candor in both the subjective and objective senses. As to subjective
candor, if certain factors are deemed appropriate bases for decision (that is,
those presented by the parties), and all others are not, then a court is likely to
describe its decision in terms of the permitted factors even if they do not
constitute the actual grounds of decision.211 In its generic sense, a requirement
of subjective candor simply requires that the publicly announced reasons for a
court’s decision correspond with the “true” reasons for the decision, at least to
the extent such correspondence is possible. Standing alone, such a requirement
places no restrictions on the proper bases for decision beyond the more general
requirement that, loosely speaking, they be legally appropriate.212 When coupled
with a requirement of strong responsiveness, however, a subjective candor
requirement places a potentially large range of otherwise permissible grounds
for decision off-limits, because the proper grounds for decision now include
only those offered by the parties. As a consequence, if a court concludes that the
parties have somehow mischaracterized their dispute and that resolution properly turns on factors other than those identified by the parties, in order to be
strongly responsive, the court would have to ignore its conclusion and nonetheless attempt to base its decision only on the arguments the parties presented. It
might be logically possible to decide in this manner. That is, a court could
perhaps resolve what it perceives to be a tort claim on the contract law theories
the parties have argued. But there would be a significant tension between
decision in such a manner and a requirement of subjective candor, because the
court by definition would be deciding the case not merely on grounds that it
does not believe provide an appropriate basis for decision, but quite possibly on
grounds that it does not even believe provide a logical means of approaching the
problem. In such circumstances there would be a temptation to somehow justify
the decision on the permissible, strongly responsive grounds even though the
court has difficulty conceiving of (and thus actually deciding) the case on those
terms.213

211. See supra note 32 (observing the judicial tendency to craft opinions giving the appearance of
certainty that the outcome is determined by appropriate, legal materials rather than inappropriate,
nonlegal materials).
212. That the boundaries of the category of “legally appropriate” reasons for a judicial decision are
highly contestable does not affect the basic comparative point I am making.
213. This is analogous to the arguments in favor of candid approaches to statutory interpretation,
where the suggestion is that the more restrictive, textually based approaches to interpretation, by overly
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As to objective candor, a court that is restricted to picking from the alternatives presented by the parties is less likely, to resort to Calabresi’s vivid
metaphor, to look into dark corners,214 and thus less likely to gain the incremental self-awareness of the real bases for its decision that freedom from a
responsibility to be strongly responsive might engender. Of course, in a regime
requiring strongly responsive decisions, the objective criterion for assessing
candor would presumably require an analysis of the extent to which the decision
actually proceeds from the proofs and arguments of the parties.215 This is, as
Fuller acknowledges, unattainable in an absolute sense, simply because of the
impossibility of achieving complete congruence among the court and the parties
regarding the parameters of the dispute.216 There is also a danger here that
parallels that identified in the discussion of subjective candor—the danger that
judges familiar with the broad range of legally permissible bases for decision
might unconsciously base their decision on criteria other than those actually
proffered by the parties. The court might, in other words, misconstrue the
parties’ construction—or misconstruction—of doctrine. This would result in a
decision that would be more objectively candid when assessed by some broader
external criterion, such as consistency with the appropriate body of doctrine, but
less so when measured according to strong responsiveness. As with subjective
candor, the problem is not that strong responsiveness creates new opportunities
for failures of candor so much as it expands existing opportunities by greatly
restricting the range of permissible grounds for decision.
Of course, not even the most extreme scholarly advocate of judicial candor
argues that the obligation of candor is unqualified.217 Yet it seems clear that
conflicts between candor and strong responsiveness must at least occasionally,
and probably generally, be resolved in favor of candor. Neither is an end in itself.
Rather, both serve to facilitate the larger dispute-resolution and law-declaration
functions of adjudication, which are (as we have seen) themselves in tension. In
some situations the fulfillment of those functions will justify dispensing with
one, the other, or perhaps even both.218 A systematic prioritization of candor and
strong responsiveness, assuming one is even possible, is beyond the scope of
this Article. The important point is simply that the conflict between candor and
strong responsiveness exists, and that it must at least sometimes be resolved
against strong responsiveness, thereby providing further support for the conclusion that the adjudicative duty ought not require strong responsiveness.

restricting the grounds on which courts may justify their interpretations, simply generate more
subterfuge, since courts either cannot or will not limit their decisions to such grounds. See Zeppos,
supra note 144, at 360–62.
214. CALABRESI, supra note 144, at 172.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 161–163 (defining objective candor in terms of external
criteria of assessment).
216. See supra text accompanying note 61.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 170–172.
218. See KRONMAN, supra note 24, at 339–40.
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b. The Case for a Duty of Weak Responsiveness. Weak responsiveness is not
merely consistent with the proper workings of adjudication, but affirmatively
works to facilitate such functioning. It ensures that the court comes to terms
with the parties’ dispute, but allows for a departure from the parties’ view of the
dispute if they have mischaracterized its nature or overlooked some factor that
is key to its appropriate resolution. In effect, it expands the range of resolutions
available to the court. A court obligated to be strongly responsive must come to
a full appreciation of the dispute as the parties perceive it and then resolve the
dispute by choosing from the range of alternatives implicitly put before it by the
parties. A court required only to be weakly responsive must come to the same
understanding of the dispute as a strongly responsive court, but it need not feel
constrained to resolve the case on the parties’ terms. This requirement preserves
the crucial elements of the dispute resolution function while allowing weakly
responsive courts the freedom to achieve the other goals of adjudication—be
they law-creation, the articulation and application of public values, or accounting for the interests of nonparties. At the same time, this approach preserves the
meaningfulness of party participation, itself of independent significance for
adjudicative legitimacy.
These notions are either implicit in or consistent with the conceptions of
adjudication discussed in Part II. Although neither Fuller nor Eisenberg makes
the point expressly, their formulation of the classic model calls for weak
responsiveness as a fallback position should strong responsiveness prove inappropriate. A decision on grounds other than those offered by the parties might
prove necessary in service of other ends of adjudication, but it nonetheless
stands in obvious tension with the Participation Thesis. Even if the court
concludes that the parties have missed the point and that resolution of a claim
properly turns on factors other than those the parties have emphasized or even
mentioned, the court should nonetheless provide some form of response to the
parties’ arguments. In other words, the court should acknowledge those arguments and explain why it believes they provide inappropriate grounds for
resolution. By elucidating its reasoning for resorting to such alternative grounds,
a court can at least assure the parties that their participation was meaningful,
even if not ultimately so. The court’s explanation also signals to the public that
the parties’ arguments received due consideration, even if the arguments did not
ultimately affect the result. This in turn enhances adjudicative legitimacy on a
more global level by assuring prospective litigants that their participation will
likewise be factored into the court’s decisional process and thereby holds the
potential to affect the result.219
There are likewise strong arguments for the imposition of a duty to be weakly
responsive under the public law model’s conception of adjudication. As noted

219. For another conception of how participation can be viewed as “meaningful” even if it does not
factor into the result, see Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 25–27 (2001).
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above, the model values participation both as an independent good and for its
instrumental contributions.220 In this regard it is worth returning to the observation that the classic and public law models are not as incompatible as often
portrayed.221 While Fuller is typically associated with a model of adjudication
that emphasizes the dispute resolution function of adjudication to the near
exclusion of the lawmaking function, this may be a mischaracterization of
Fuller.222 And even if the standard characterization of Fuller’s position is
correct, the two models need not be viewed as making mutually exclusive
claims, either descriptively or normatively. Instead, it may be that the models
depict two perceptions of the judicial role, neither of which is absolutely or
unqualifiedly correct, but both of which appropriately describe adjudication in
different contexts.223 Fuller’s model might therefore be appropriate, both descriptively and in terms of its normative implications, for traditional, bipolar litigation. At the same time, the public law model may provide better guidance in a
case having direct implications for nonparties. Under such a view, particularly if
one sees Fuller’s model as providing the default model,224 the argument for
weak responsiveness in public law cases becomes slightly stronger.
A related argument, and a particularly compelling one if the public law model
primarily emphasizes the lawmaking function of courts, is that weak responsiveness facilitates lawmaking. While the parties may not be in a position to provide
full information to the court, they will often be able to provide a good deal of
information that is critical to a fully informed decision, and an assurance that
their arguments and information will be meaningfully factored into the decisionmaking process creates a strong incentive to provide that information.225 More
directly, the court’s engagement with the parties’ agents will itself clarify the
content of the law. Simply put, a court’s determination of what the law is in the
context of a particular case, even if that determination is based on arguments
and information beyond what the parties have presented, is nonetheless enhanced by an articulation of why those arguments and that information do not
compel a different outcome.

220. See supra text accompanying notes 134–135; Sturm, supra note 97, at 1391–96 (exploring the
extent to which party participation is a shared norm between the models).
221. See supra Part II.C.4. Jonathan Molot suggests that the public law attack on Fuller was directed
to a much greater extent at Fuller’s conception of adjudication’s limits than its forms. Indeed, Chayes
and Fiss “embraced many—but not all—of Fuller’s ideas on litigation’s forms.” Molot, supra note 35,
at 36 n.18.
222. See Bone, supra note 56, at 1275 (“Contrary to conventional wisdom, Fuller’s theory lies
somewhere between the public law and dispute resolution poles of this dichotomy, and considerably
closer to the public law end.”).
223. See supra Part III.C.3; Dan-Cohen, supra note 51, at 5–6 (articulating such a unitarian vision of
the models).
224. The fact that Chayes and Fiss largely accept Fuller’s conception of litigation’s forms, see supra
note 221, provides some support for this position.
225. Chayes implicitly recognizes this point. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1308 (noting the
advantages conferred by party presentation of information, even if incomplete).
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Weak responsiveness likewise operates to satisfy the requirements of adjudication as representation. Peters’s suggestion that the democratic legitimacy of
judicial lawmaking decreases in relation to a court’s departure from the norm of
strong responsiveness226 implies that weak responsiveness would serve only as
a distant second-best mechanism. A court obligated only to be weakly responsive to the parties’ arguments, after all, would be free to base its decision on
grounds not asserted by the parties. Yet the legitimacy differential between
strongly and weakly responsive judicial decisionmaking, measured in terms of
the extent to which such decisionmaking is democratic, may not be that
great.227 So long as weak responsiveness requires that the decision maker
actually factor the proofs and arguments of the parties into the decisionmaking
process, the baseline requirements of the theory are satisfied. Without delving
into the theoretical underpinnings of adjudication as representation, the analogy
between courts and legislative bodies as representative lawmakers seems expansive enough to allow for a judicial role that requires that the decisional process
include consideration of, as opposed to selection among, the grounds for
decision offered by the parties. We do not question the democratic legitimacy of
legislation simply because direct democracy might have resulted in different
law.228 Judicial lawmaking resulting from party participation that is meaningful,
even if not dispositive, might likewise achieve the sort of democratic legitimacy
that Peters describes.
Finally, the relationship between weak responsiveness and candor is likewise
one of enhancement. A court operating under a requirement of weak responsiveness must consider and respond to the proofs and arguments offered by the
parties, but it need not feel constrained to ground its decision in them. It cannot
simply ignore inconvenient facts or precedent presented by the parties. It must
instead provide a reasoned explanation of why those facts or that precedent do
not make the case before it as distinct from the run of cases as it might
otherwise appear. This is not to suggest that weak responsiveness provides a

226. See supra text accompanying note 89.
227. Peters’s later works appear to recognize this dynamic:
Without responsiveness to the parties’ efforts, a court decision is only a judge’s decision, not a
decision of which the parties can claim some authorship and in which they have some stake.
An unresponsive decision is no better than rule by fiat.
In adjudication, the primary evidence that the court’s decision is responsive to the efforts of
the litigants is the written (or sometimes oral) judicial opinion. A well-crafted opinion
demonstrates that the arguments of the losing litigant have been considered in good faith and
rejected on their merits.
Christopher J. Peters, Participation, Representation, and Principled Adjudication, 8 LEGAL THEORY 185,
192 (2002) [hereinafter Peters, Participation]; see also Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and
the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705 (2004).
228. One who adheres to an extreme form of the view that legislative representatives are to serve as
the agents of their constituents might raise an objection on this basis, but whatever its normative merits
the position lacks descriptive merit. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 123–24 (2d ed. 1995).
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cure-all for candor violations. The court’s reasoned rejection of the parties’
assertions might after all not reflect the true reasons behind the decision. While
a requirement of weak responsiveness would not ensure full candor, even if that
were desirable, it would create an obstacle to many violations of candor, while
not presenting the incentives toward subterfuge that flow from strong responsiveness. If a court concludes the parties have misapprehended the nature of their
dispute, the court would not be constrained to attempt to somehow force what it
has concluded is the square peg of resolution into the round hole of the
analytical framework the parties have furnished. It could instead make and
explain its decision in terms of the factors it has concluded are appropriate. The
requirement that it consider and respond to the parties’ arguments in the course
of elaborating its decision would function to enhance candor in this context.
Likewise, where the court might prefer to justify its decision on grounds that do
not reflect the true reasons behind its decision, an effective weak-responsiveness
requirement would create a substantial barrier: proofs and arguments (suggested
by the parties) the court would otherwise seek to evade. Weak responsiveness
would mitigate objective failures of candor for similar reasons. An obligation to
give meaningful consideration to the parties’ arguments and assertions increases
the likelihood that the court will peer into the dark corners of the dispute and its
legal context and consequently be more candid in an objective sense.
3. Elaboration
Largely absent from the literature articulating and developing the models of
adjudication discussed in this Article is consideration of the relationship between the adjudicative behavior prescribed by those models and courts’ elaboration on that behavior. This is a complex relationship, and it constitutes a subject
too broad for comprehensive treatment in the context of this Article. Even so,
there is considerable value in uniting these disparate lines of scholarship.
Judicial opinions provide nearly all the information available to the public
regarding what a court has done. As a result, any attempt to prescribe judicial
behavior must be mindful of the nature of elaboration, its possible limitations as
the basis for enforcing prescriptions, and the possibility that the process of
elaboration may have effects on the behavior it merely purports to describe.
Accordingly, this section outlines the two views of the relationship and offers
the conclusion that, at least in the appellate context, both views support at a
minimum a robust preference for elaboration, the depth of which should in turn
be a function of the candor obligation.
a. Elaboration as Evidence of Adjudicative Behavior. According to one view
of the relationship between elaboration and the proper processes of judicial
decision, elaboration serves merely as an instrument to validate the proper
workings of the decisionmaking process, rather than as an essential component
of that process. This view separates the act of deciding from the act of
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justification.229 Thus a judicial decision can be legitimate even without the
issuance of reasons supporting it so long as the process that led to the decision
complied with the criteria of legitimacy. Under this view, it is more important
that the court actually make its decision in a weakly responsive fashion (if that
is the relevant criterion) than that it announce to the world that it did so and
how.
This position is implicit in the work of Fuller and Eisenberg, both of whom
suggest that elaboration is a preferred but not essential component of adjudication.230 From their perspective, opinions are valuable because they help to
ensure the parties that their presentation of proofs and arguments was not in
vain, and because the requirement of issuing an opinion also disciplines the
court to consider those proofs and arguments.231 Neither addresses the concepts
of depth or candor, although it is reasonable to suppose that the goal of
maximizing party participation creates a preference for greater depth, at least
insofar as the elaboration relates to components of the analysis that are responsive to the parties’ arguments. The relationship between candor and participation is somewhat less straightforward, as the preceding discussion revealed.
Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to adjudication as representation and the public law model. In the case of the former, Peters does not directly
address the issue of whether elaboration is to be required, although the implications of adjudication as representation on this point do not differ from what we
have already encountered. A requirement that a court’s decision be strongly
responsive to the parties’ arguments does not compel the conclusion that the
court provide elaboration, for the same reasons that Fuller’s theory does not
support a duty of elaboration. Nor does anything else in Peters’s theory require
elaboration. A court can decide claims and cases in accordance with the theory’s
dictates without having to announce to the world that it has done so. However,
just as Fuller concluded that the issuance of opinions advances the integrity of
adjudication, it also advances adjudication as representation.232 Here, too, we
find a preference for elaboration.
The public law model likewise prefers but does not compel a duty of
elaboration. Given its relative emphasis on the lawmaking function, the model
clearly supports a preference for elaboration. While elaboration of the reasoning

229. See, e.g., SOLAN, supra note 32, at 174 (suggesting that the distinction between the two
activities leads to the phenomenon in which “judges will sometimes find it difficult to present
acceptable justifications for their decisions, even when the judges are comfortable with the decisions
themselves”); RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 548 (2d ed. 1996) (“[T]he judicial resolution
of a legal dispute implicates two separate processes: (1) deciding, or the process of discovering the
conclusion, and (2) justifying, or the process of public exposition of that conclusion.”).
230. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 412; Fuller, supra note 9, at 387–88.
231. This is not a point that Fuller expressly makes. It is, nonetheless, a common theme in the
literature concerning judicial opinions that the act of writing engenders more comprehensive consideration of the grounds on which the opinion is based. See infra note 241.
232. See Peters, Participation, supra note 227, at 192–93 (noting, with reference to Fuller, the
importance of opinions to the functioning of adjudication as representation).
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behind a court’s decision might not be strictly necessary to the development and
evolution of legal standards—because interested parties could track the results
of cases and attempt to divine the underlying principles themselves—the absence of elaboration would significantly hinder the process. This is particularly
so if courts exist primarily “to give meaning to our public values”233 rather than
merely to resolve disputes. Moreover, if the case requires the court to intervene
in a set of ongoing relations among those whose interests are potentially
affected, as is typical of institutional reform cases, some elaboration may be
necessary as a practical matter. These arguments also suggest a preference for
comparatively full elaboration—without being so strong as to support a categorical duty. Cases presenting no new issues of law or implementation, for example,
might not require an opinion, because the lawmaking function is not implicated.234
Although the instrumental nature of elaboration under this conception cannot,
standing alone, support a duty, it comes close. The benefits associated with
judicial candor235 can only be achieved if courts provide reasons for their
decisions. Because judicial opinions provide the nearly exclusive basis for
assessing courts’ performance, there must at a minimum be a strong preference
for elaboration that is both full and candid. This becomes apparent from even a
brief consideration of a world without judicial opinions. In the absence of
elaboration neither the parties nor the public could determine the bases of a
court’s decision. Nor could they assess the adequacy of those bases. From the
public’s perspective, decisions based on reason would be indistinguishable from
decisions based on whim. This would erode confidence in the process and along
with it the perceived legitimacy of adjudication as a mechanism for dispute
resolution.236 A world without judicial opinions would also be a world in which
fulfillment of the lawmaking function would be nearly impossible. Unless a
court elaborates on its reasons for decision, it provides no guidance concerning
how it will resolve similar cases in the future. To be sure, interested parties
would undoubtedly track the results of adjudication—and from those results
attempt to divine the principles behind them—but this would not constitute the

233. Fiss, supra note 10, at 29.
234. Precisely how often such cases are likely to arise is a matter of some dispute. According to one
view, there will almost never be a case in which elaboration would fail to be appropriate under this
standard, because no two cases are identical, and consequently every decision extends the law at least
slightly. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219,
222–23 (1999). This question underlies a significant portion of the debate over the appropriateness of
nonprecedential opinions. See supra note 4.
235. See supra Part II.D.
236. See D. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 737 (“A requirement that judges give reasons for their
decisions—grounds of decision that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in
constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power.”); Wald, supra note 147, at 1372 (“One of the few ways
we have to justify our power to decide matters important to our fellow citizens is to explain why we
decide as we do.”).
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making of law in the sense that we expect.237 There is undoubtedly some room
for disagreement concerning both how full238 and how candid239 elaboration
ought to be to adequately support the lawmaking function. What is clear is that
some elaboration is necessary to effectuate judicial lawmaking. But again, this
argument does not extend so far as to require elaboration in all cases.
There are, however, strong pragmatic arguments in favor of a duty to
elaborate. The costs of requiring elaboration in all cases might be relatively
small in comparison with the benefit to adjudicative legitimacy in the aggregate.
A duty of elaboration scaled to the need for candor would require very little
from a court in “easy” cases, in which there is no new law to be made and little
need to assure the public that the decisions are not the product of mere whim. A
court could provide candid elaboration on its decision by saying very little,
perhaps only a sentence or two along with a cite to the controlling authority. At
the same time, the absence of a duty would create a temptation to avoid
elaboration in at least some cases in which it would be highly desirable.240 In
sum, although the logic of elaboration under this conception only supports a
preference, there are strong prudential arguments for imposing a duty.
b. Elaboration as an Integral Part of Adjudicative Behavior. There is another
view, however, according to which the processes of decision and justification
cannot be separated. It is common for the act of writing to enhance clarity and
precision of thought. Accordingly, many judges have observed that a decision
that once seemed perfectly reasonable can often turn out to be considerably less
so following an attempt to write a justification.241 David McGowan presses the
point, asserting “that the premise that judicial writing can be divorced from

237. See Fuller, supra note 9, at 388; see also James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367 (1995) (“One can have law of a certain kind without the judicial opinion, then,
perhaps of a good kind. But with the opinion, a wholly different dimension of legal life and thought
becomes possible—the systematic and reasoned invocation of the past as precedent. With this practice,
in turn, there can emerge an institution that simultaneously explains and limits itself over time. It is
here, in the creation of legal authority, rather than in the facilitation of prediction, that the opinion
performs its peculiar and most important task.”).
238. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of
Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 809, 833–46 (1993) (arguing that social inclusion is aided by
ambiguous opinions); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1736 (1995) (suggesting the desirability of opinions employing “relatively narrow or low-level explanations” for the conclusions they justify).
239. See supra Part II.D.
240. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McAuliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1998, at 157, 163 n.24 (suggesting that one federal court recently operated under a norm in which it
routinely disposed of some of its hardest cases by means of summary affirmances without elaboration).
241. See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS 120 (1994) (“A decisionmaker who must reason through to a conclusion in print has reasoned
in fact.”); CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 31 (“Conclusions easily reached without setting down the
reasons sometimes undergo revision when the decider sets out to justify the decision.”); Wald, supra
note 147, at 1374–75 (noting that the process of justifying a decision often leads to a change of
rationale or even result, and contrasting this with the process of “writing to explain a preordained
result”).
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deciding or other aspects of judging is wrong.”242 He argues instead that writing
and deciding are inextricably linked: “Writing affects how judges judge. The
opinion form also affects what questions judges believe they may decide and
how they may decide them.”243
Of course, the descriptive claim that the act of writing affects the process of
adjudication the writing is intended to describe does not lead necessarily to the
normative claim that the process must therefore incorporate the act of writing. It
may result in “better” decisions, whether measured by rationality or some other
standard, but that may not be enough to support the imposition of a duty.244
After all, nowhere in our exploration of adjudicative theory have we encountered the notion that any of the participants are entitled to perfection. “Getting it
right” is one of the competing values at stake, but as the legal chestnut has it,
sometimes it is better that cases be decided finally than that they be decided
correctly.245 An elaboration requirement cannot come without costs. Given a
system in which the parties bear primary responsibility for developing arguments,246 and in which judicial resources are scarce,247 there are pragmatic
arguments that it is unrealistic and perhaps inappropriate to expect judges to
work through a written justification of the decision in each case.248
Even so, one can imagine various arguments supporting the proposition that
the superiority of the decisions resulting from elaboration justifies the imposition of a duty. Writing might simply be critical to sound decisionmaking, in
which case decisions rendered without the aid of elaboration would be illegitimate by definition. Alternatively, one might suppose that writing is necessary in
every case to ensure that courts ferret out those cases that turn out to be more
complex or otherwise difficult than they first appear. This might be so because,
by its nature, the act of adjudication requires that decisions be made in this way.
Or it might be the case that adjudicative decisionmaking requires a certain level
of involvement with the subject of the decision that can only be attained by
242. McGowan, supra note 144, at 513.
243. Id.
244. See Tidmarsh, supra note 56, at 1729–30 (questioning Fuller’s procedural prescriptions by
asserting that they do not necessarily follow from Fuller’s norm of party participation: “Fuller’s further
assumption that procedures that better advance the norm are somehow ‘more valid’ does not seem to be
required normatively”).
245. The allusion, of course, is to Justice Brandeis’s assertion that “in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.” Burnett v. Colo. Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Although Brandeis was speaking to the
desirability of settling a rule of law rather than an individual dispute, a similar dynamic exists in the
context of resolving individual cases. At some point, the virtues of finality outweigh the costs involved
in efforts that might result in marginal enhancements in accuracy. For a discussion of some of these
issues, see Oldfather, supra note 198, at 483–86, 490–94.
246. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 3–4 (1988).
247. See supra note 42.
248. Of course, nowadays it may be inappropriate as a descriptive matter to expect most judges to
work through a written justification at all in any capacity other than that of an editor. See BAKER, supra
note 241, at 140–47; POSNER, supra note 38, at 147–49.
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decisions involving elaboration. Whatever the appeal of these views, they are
not justified by the theoretical tools canvassed in this Article. The classic and
public law conceptions of adjudication—at least as treated by the theorists
discussed in this Article—envision elaboration as mere evidence of adjudicative
behavior. That does not mean that a conception of the adjudicative duty that
requires elaboration as a necessary component of the judicial function would be
inconsistent with the processes identified in the models. But consistency without more does not constitute justification. Ultimately, even if the link between
decision and elaboration is more than merely instrumental, such a relationship
does not necessarily support the imposition of a duty to elaborate. Further work
remains to be done.
c. The Robust Preference for Elaboration. It is clear that the theoretical
underpinnings of the American adjudicative system, however conceived, support the existence of a strong preference for elaboration on the reasons behind
judicial decisions. To a significant degree, the system could not function otherwise. Moreover, there are compelling arguments for the imposition of a duty to
elaborate. While none of these arguments standing alone can justify a requirement of elaboration in all cases—at least absent further work demonstrating that
elaboration is a necessary component of sound adjudication—taken together,
they render elaboration desirable in nearly every case. The depth of that
elaboration, meanwhile, should be a function of the duty to be weakly responsive, coupled with the desire for candor—itself a virtue that is strongly preferred
but subject to enough potential exceptions to avoid characterization as a duty.
Although this set of conclusions may lack the theoretical elegance that a
series of categorical duties might possess, as a practical matter its prescriptions
are clear. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the court should provide
reasons for its decision. To the extent possible, those reasons should be the
“real” reasons for the court’s conclusions, both subjectively and objectively. The
depth of the elaboration, in turn, should be driven by the need for candor, which
will require less in easy cases than in more difficult ones. While there may, in
theory, be cases in which the lack of elaboration would be appropriate, such
cases ought to be so rare as to be negligible. In effect, the theoretical preference
for elaboration should compel a practical duty.
4. The Adjudicative Duty Summarized
What emerges from our summary of adjudicative theory is a well-defined
core duty to decide. Under any of the dominant models of adjudication, courts
must—at a minimum—decide the claims presented in a weakly responsive
fashion. There is a preference for strong responsiveness, although other ends of
adjudication, such as fulfillment of the lawmaking function, may require departures from this preference. There is also a strong preference—and depending on
one’s conception of the relationship between decision and elaboration, arguably
a duty—for full, candid elaboration. These, then, are the sticks by which

2005]

DEFINING JUDICIAL INACTIVISM

181

judicial inactivism is to be measured.
To provide some further sense of how this works in practice, let us return to
the examples explored in Part I. There we saw Defendant X, whose First
Amendment defense to a consumer fraud claim was ignored by the court, and
Plaintiff Y, whose argument that her claim is materially distinct from those
disallowed under prior cases was either “glossed over” or “recharacterized” by
the court that ruled against her. On the surface, at least, both of these situations
present clear violations of the adjudicative duty as I have described it. In the
case of Defendant X, the court appears not to have decided one of the claims
presented, and in the case of Plaintiff Y, the court’s decision was not even
weakly responsive to Y’s arguments. Instead, the court resorted to precedent as
if Y’s asserted distinction had never been raised.
As even this brief consideration reveals, elaboration is critical to meaningful
assessment of whether a court has breached its duty in a given case. At least to
the extent that the processes of decision and elaboration are distinct, a court’s
failure to elaborate on its decision in a manner consistent with the requirements
of the duty does not mean that the underlying decision was not made in the
appropriate manner. But the mere existence of such a gap means that the court
has not been candid about its decision. Moreover, that failure is unlikely to be
grounded in one of the appropriate excuses for a lack of candor, even in the
broad formulations of those who are relatively permissive about excusing a lack
of full candor.249 In general, this sort of gap between elaboration and the type of
decisionmaking called for by the adjudicative duty is strong evidence that the
court has not gone about its decision in the appropriate manner. Only if the
court finds it difficult to square its decision with the apparent dictates of
precedent, or if it actually gives little consideration to the issue, will it be likely
to fail to candidly address the matter in its opinion. Thus, once a court
undertakes to provide some elaboration on its decision, it should provide
enough elaboration to satisfy the candor requirement.
It bears further emphasis that the duty to decide does not compel the court to
accept either party’s characterization of their claim or the relevant authority. The
court must, however, attend to the arguments, factor them into its decisional
process, and reject them—if that is what it ultimately decides to do—only for
legally appropriate reasons. Elaboration on its decision must—absent extraordinary circumstances—candidly reflect that process. Thus, its opinion should
articulate the bases for its conclusion that a party’s characterization of its claim
does not provide an appropriate ground for resolution.
CONCLUSION
As courts continue to respond to the pressures created by their expanding
dockets, concern over judicial inactivism will continue to grow. The recent

249. See supra text accompanying notes 170–178.
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explosion in concern and commentary regarding the widespread use of unpublished, nonprecedential opinions250 provides just one example of the problems
that arise when expediency clashes with our core understanding of the judicial
role. Debates concerning the need for structural reform are also likely to
resurface.251 This Article presents an attempt to articulate that core understanding more precisely, and thus to provide a framework and set of criteria by which
to assess both historic and future changes in the adjudicative process. Like the
models of adjudication from which it is largely drawn, the duty to decide
represents an idealized conception of the judicial role. What is more, it, like all
conceptions of adjudication, is subject to modification as the needs of society
and the functions of adjudication shift. It is nonetheless important that necessary
modification be undertaken in a way that is mindful of the theory underlying the
mechanism being changed. As I have demonstrated, there is a fundamental
consistency among the dominant models of American adjudication concerning
the minimal components of legitimate adjudication. Decisions must be at least
weakly responsive to the proofs and arguments of the parties and should
candidly elaborate on the underlying reasoning. Departures from these norms
should be undertaken only with great caution and with due regard for the
broader functions of adjudication.

250. See supra note 4.
251. For an overview of past reform discussions, see DANIEL J. MEADOR
STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 1047–1158 (1994).
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